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The des ign  of systems of marketable permits  f o r  water  consumption from 
n a t u r a l  watercourses  i s  examined through a  q u a l i t a t i v e  overview and a  quan- 
t i t a t i v e  quasi-empir ical ,  quasi-hypothet ical  case  s tudy.  For t h e  work rep- 
o r t e d  upon here ,  t h e  most important cons ide ra t i ons  a r e  those  a s soc i a t ed  
wi th :  1) u n c e r t a i n t y  of f u t u r e  streamflows and economic cond i t i ons ,  2)  
l o c a t i o n a l  i s s u e s ,  and 3 )  e f f i c i e n t  and e f f e c t i v e  func t ion ing  of t h e  mar- 
k e t s .  P a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n  i s  g iven  t o  t h e  problem of implementing market- 
a b l e  r i g h t s  systems i n  reg ions  p r e s e n t l y  fol lowing t h e  r i p a r i a n  d o c t r i n e .  
I n  t he se  reg ions  t h e  most important design dec i s ions  include:  t h e  b a s i s  of 
d e f i n i t i o n  of permi ts ,  t he  means f o r  i n i t i a l l y  d i s t r i b u t i n g  them, t h e  type 
of market mechanism used f o r  t h e i r  t r a n s f e r  a f t e r  they a r e  i s sued ,  and t h e  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  placed on t h e i r  use  and t r a n s f e r .  These design dec i s ions  a r e  
examined here  wi th  r e spec t  t o  program o b j e c t i v e s  inc lud ing:  economic e f f i -  
c iency ,  e q u i t y ,  e a se  of admin i s t r a t i on  and implementation, and maintenance 
of instream f lows.  A l t e r n a t i v e  approaches t o  t he  des ign  problems a r e  discus-  
sed and t rade-of fs  implied by t h e  dec i s ions  a r e  i d e n t i f i e d .  
The e f f i c i e n c y  of two marketable water  r i g h t s  systems i n  a  l e n t i c  
( l a k e - l i k e )  s t r u c t u r e  i s  assessed  q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  f o r  a  case  s tudy  based on 
hypo the t i ca l  i r r i g a t i o n  water use.  Water r i g h t s  markets a r e  simulated on t h e  
bases  of no f o r e s i g h t  and p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  on t h e  p a r t s  of u s e r s ,  and t h e  
economic outcomes of t he se  markets a r e  eva lua ted  from both ex a n t e  and ex 
post pe r spec t ives .  The market outcomes a r e  compared t o  t h e  opt imal  ( e f f i -  
c i e n t )  scheme and t o  two a l t e r n a t i v e  non-market p o l i c i e s .  D i s t r i b u t i o n a l  
a s p e c t s  of markets a r e  examined on t h e  b a s i s  of i nd iv idua l  f i n a n c i a l  ga in  t o  
t h e  u s e r s .  Simulat ion r e s u l t s  show t h a t  higher  e f f i c i e n c y  i s  obta ined  f o r  
t h e  two market systems than f o r  t he  non-market p o l i c i e s  and t h a t  t h e  market 
systems recoup about 95% of t he  economic va lue  of t h e  opt imal  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  
The r e s u l t s  suggest  t h a t  most of t he  5% e f f i c i e n c y  l o s s  should be a t t r i b u t e d  
t o  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  imposed by the  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  r i g h t s ,  r a t h e r  than  the  
users '  i n a b i l i t y  t o  p r e d i c t  f u t u r e  events .  
KEYWORDS: Water Rights ,  Markets, Water Permi ts ,  Economics 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea of increas ing  the  e f f i c i e n c y  and f l e x i b i l i t y  of present  water 
a l l o c a t i o n  systems by i n s t i t u t i n g  systems of t r a n s f e r a b l e  water r i g h t s  has 
been suggested by a  number of t h e o r e t i c a l  and appl ied  s t u d i e s  of water 
resources  [ s ee ,  e.g. ,  Milliman, 1959; H i r s h l e i f e r  & d., 1969; Tre lease ,  
1965; Johnson, 1971; U.S. National Water Commission, 1973; Oe l t j en  and 
F i sche r ,  1978; Burness and Quirk, 1979 and 19801. Despi te  t h i s  genera l  
i n t e r e s t  i n  marketable r i g h t s ,  however, t h e r e  has been r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  
r e sea rch  i n t o  the  s p e c i f i c  d e t a i l s  of these  market systems, including such 
ques t ions  a s  how the  permits  might be defined,  i n i t i a l l y  d i s t r i b u t e d ,  and 
exchanged. This  r epo r t  p re sen t s  the  r e s u l t s  of research  devoted t o  
examining these  i s sues ,  which can have important impl ica t ions  f o r  the  
e f f i c i e n c y  and e f f i c a c y  of markets i n  water r i g h t s .  
The primary ob jec t ive  of t h i s  research  i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  and compare 
a l t e r n a t i v e  designs of marketable water permit systems f o r  humid r eg ions ,  
where t h e r e  is usua l ly  a  longstanding l e g a l  precedent of t he  r i p a r i a n  
doc t r ine .  However, many of t he  f ind ings  may a l s o  be appl ied  t o  reg ions  where 
the  app ropr i a t ive  doc t r ine  has t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been i n  use,  e i t h e r  a lone  o r  i n  
conjunct ion with the  r i p a r i a n  system. 
The d i scuss ion  which fol lows assumes the  ex i s t ence  of a  s t a t e ,  
r eg iona l ,  o r  r i v e r  bas in  a u t h o r i t y  which has t he  power and o b l i g a t i o n  t o  
c o n t r o l  water withdrawals and consumption from watercourses  and a q u i f e r s  
under i t s  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  The a u t h o r i t y ,  i t  i s  assumed, wishes t o  i n s t a l l  a  
system of marketable water permits ,  and i s  searching f o r  t he  most favorable  
s e t  of r u l e s  and procedures f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  watercourse.  
Such a  design t a sk  may be viewed a s  a  mul t i -objec t ive  opt imiza t ion  
problem, where the  design dec i s ion  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  represented  by the  choice 
of r u l e s  governing the  system. Examples of these  r u l e s  a re :  the  b a s i s  of 
d e f i n i t i o n  of t he  p e r m i t s ; . t h e i r  du ra t ion ;  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  i f  any, on 
t h e i r  t r a n s f e r ;  and the  type of d i s t r i b u t i o n  method used(e.g. ,  two-party 
s a l e s ,  s ing le-c lear ing-pr ice  auc t ion ,  d i sc r imina t ing  auc t ion ,  e t c . ) .  The 
design o r  po l icy  ob jec t ives  considered i n  t h i s  paper a r e :  economic 
e f f i c i e n c y ,  equi ty ,  ease  of implementation and admin i s t r a t i on ,  and 
maintenance of instream flows f o r  support of aqua t i c  ecosystems. The s e t  of 
design dec i s ions  which b e s t  f u l f i l l s  t he  pol icy  o b j e c t i v e s  w i l l  vary from 
one a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  another ,  depending on the  hydrologic p r o p e r t i e s  of t he  
watercourse and the  geographical  p a t t e r n s  of water use.  I n  t h i s  s tudy,  we 
have not  attempted t o  choose between competing ob jec t ives  o r  des igns ,  but  
r a t h e r  have sought t o  compare permit system designs wi th  r e spec t  t o  t he  
above o b j e c t i v e s ,  and t o  eva lua te  the  necessary t rade-of fs  among these  
o b j e c t i v e s .  
I n  t h i s  r e p o r t ,  it i s  assumed t h a t  a l l  water r i g h t s  a r e  def ined i n  
terms of water consumption and t h a t  u se r s  d e s i r i n g  water  f o r  pass-through 
use only can s a t i s f y  t h i s  need using instream flows, without r equ i r ing  a  
marketable permit .  This assumption s e t s  a s i d e  the  concerns of s eve ra l  o the r  
i n v e s t i g a t o r s  i n  t h i s  f i e l d  about some poss ib l e  e f f e c t s  of t r a n s f e r s  upon 
the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of r e t u r n  flows [ see ,  f o r  example, E l l i s ,  1966; Hartman 
and Seastone,  1970; Johnson, e t  a l . ,  19811. The assumption was made 
p r imar i ly  t o  s impl i fy  the  ana lyses  which fol low,  but  may be j u s t i f i e d  by 
the  fol lowing argument. The primary a p p l i c a t i o n  of t h i s  research  i s  the  
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1- UNCERTAINTY AND THE DEFINITION OF PERMITS 
Markets i n  water  r i g h t s  w i l l  p r e sen t  t o  t h e  u s e r s  a  degree of 
u n c e r t a i n t y  which v a r i e s  wi th  the  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  market,  t h e  na tu re  of 
t h e  water  supply,  and the  types  of water  use.  The s t o c h a s t i c  na tu re  of 
water  supply and demand a l s o  causes  c e r t a i n  r i s k s  t o  be borne by the  
a u t h o r i t y .  D i f f e r e n t  market s t r u c t u r e s  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  a  g r e a t e r  o r  l e s s e r  
degree of r i s k  t h a t  instream flow needs w i l l  no t  be met, o r  t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  
no t  be enough water t o  f u l f i l l  a l l  l eg i t ima te  c la ims.  An example of a  
s i t u a t i o n  wi th  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  u n c e r t a i n t y  would be where water is drawn 
from a  l a r g e  lake  wi th  known and s teady  average inf low,  and i s  used i n  a  
cont inuously ope ra t i ng  manufacturing process  which produces a  commodity wi th  
a  very  s t a b l e  p r i ce .  An example of a  r e l a t i v e l y  unce r t a in  s i t u a t i o n  would be 
where a  small  r i v e r  whose f low f l u c t u a t e s  cons iderab ly  supp l i e s  water  which 
i s  used t o  i r r i g a t e  a  crop whose p r i c e  i s  sub jec t  t o  f l u c t u a t i o n  and whose 
response t o  appl ied  i r r i g a t i o n  water  depends on h ighly  v a r i a b l e  weather.  
One e f f e c t  of unce r t a in ty  is t o  make very  unlikely--by market f o r c e s  
o r  any o t h e r  means--the a l l o c a t i o n  of water i n  an economically e f f i c i e n t  
manner from a  h inds igh t  perspec t ive .  Such an a l l o c a t i o n ,  which i s  r e f e r r e d  
t o  a s  being ex pos t  e f f i c i e n t ,  produces t h e  g r e a t e s t  economic worth which 
can be a t t a i n e d .  I f  only t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of f u t u r e  even t s  is  
known i n  advance, then t h e  assignment r u l e  which maximizes t h e  expected 
economic worth of water use i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  being ex  a n t e  e f f i c i e n t .  I n  
a l l o c a t i n g  goods without  knowledge of f u t u r e  events ,  t h i s  i s  t h e  most 
e f f i c i e n t  assignment t h a t  can be achieved. (Starr[19731 examines i n  d e t a i l  
t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between ex a n t e  and ex  pos t  e f f i c i e n c y  i n  a  genera l  
t h e o r e t i c a l  contex t . )  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  a s  d i scussed  below, t h e r e  a r e  t rade-of fs  
wi th  o t h e r  o b j e c t i v e s ,  so  t h a t  not even t h e  ex  a n t e  optimum w i l l  always be 
a t t a i n e d  v i a  t he  market. However, i n t u i t i o n  and t h e  case  s tudy undertaken i n  
t h i s  r e sea rch  suggest  t h a t  a  well-designed system may a l l o c a t e  water i n  a  
manner which n e a r l y  achieves t h i s  optimum, and e f f e c t s  a  favorab le  
compromise wi th  o the r  ob j ec t i ve s .  
A s u f f i c i e n t  condi t ion  f o r  a t t a i n i n g  an ex a n t e  e f f i c i e n t  a l l o c a t i o n  
v i a  a  compet i t ive market i s  t h e  ex i s t ence  of a  complete market i n  
cont ingent  commodity claims,  which a r e  s e t s  of c o n t r a c t s  cont ingent  on every 
p o s s i b l e  f u t u r e  s t a t e  of na tu re  [Arrow, 19641. I n  a  p r a c t i c a l  sense ,  
however, t h e  use of such claims f o r  water  a l l o c a t i o n  i s  i n f e a s i b l e ,  s i n c e  
a l l  p o s s i b l e  combinations of withdrawal o r  consumption sequences would have 
t o  be cons idered ,  a s  would a l l  pos s ib l e  combinations of t he se  wi th  o t h e r  
even t s  such a s  market p r i c e s  f o r  products  and weather cond i t i ons .  We 
cons ider  here ,  however, a  system which i s  s i m i l a r  i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  bu t  i n  which 
t h e  cont ingenc ies  upon which the  claims depend a r e  l im i t ed  t o  t h e  va lues  
assumed by t h e  few most important parameters which denote t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  
of water .  For consumption from su r f ace  watercourses ,  t h e  key parameters of 
i n t e r e s t  a r e  t h e  streamflows, measured, i n  gene ra l ,  a t  s e v e r a l  p o i n t s  
throughout t h e  bas in .  The use t o  which a  user 's  r i g h t  e n t i t l e s  him w i l l  
g e n e r a l l y  vary  wi th  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  flow, and may, i n  f a c t ,  be viewed a s  a  
f u n c t i o n  of flow. The n e t  p resen t  va lue  of such a  r i g h t  t o  a  u se r  may be 
viewed a s  a  random v a r i a b l e  wi th  known p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  which i s  a  
func t ion  of t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t h e  s t ream f lows,  a s  w e l l  a s  h i s  
compet i tors '  demands and loca t ions .  These d a t a ,  a s  w e l l  a s  o t h e r s ,  w i l l  
determine what t h e  user  i s  w i l l i n g  t o  pay f o r  t h e  r i g h t .  
A market may be designed f o r  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of long-term r i g h t s  of 
t h i s  s o r t ,  bu t  t h e  ex pos t  and ex a n t e  e f f i c i e n c y  of t h e  system may be 
improved i f  u se r s  have t h e  oppor tun i ty  t o  purchase r i g h t s  f o r  short- term use 
a t  t imes when more accu ra t e  p r e d i c t i o n s  of t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of water may be 
made. These long and short-term r i g h t s  w i l l  be r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  base r i g h t s  
and spot  r i g h t s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The spot  market i s  viewed p r imar i l y  a s  an 
informal  mechanism, c o n s i s t i n g  l a r g e l y  of two-party t r a d e s .  However, a s  a  
s e r v i c e  t o  t h e  u s e r s ,  ' the  a u t h o r i t y  may choose t o  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e  t h e  
procedure.  Such fo rma l i za t i on ,  i f  it  occurs ,  would be undertaken p r imar i l y  
f o r  t h e  purpose of un i fy ing  t h e  market by providing a  c e n t r a l  c lear inghouse 
through which p o t e n t i a l  buyers and s e l l e r s  would have an  equal  oppor tun i ty  
t o  t r ade .  
I f  t h e  market i s  t o  func t ion  a s  a  device t o  e f f e c t  t he  e f f i c i e n t ,  o r  
n e a r - e f f i c i e n t ,  a l l o c a t i o n  of water  r i g h t s ,  t h e  d u r a t i o n  of r i g h t s  should be 
f i x e d ,  and should not  be sub jec t  t o  any p a r t i c u l a r  a c t i o n s  on t h e  p a r t  of 
t h e  user  ( a s  r equ i r ed ,  f o r  example, under t h e  "use-it-or-lose-it" c l ause  i n  
some wes te rn  s t a t e s  which may encourage was te ) .  However, t h e r e  may be t rade-  
o f f s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  t h e  choice of t h e  du ra t i on .  Rights  of long d u r a t i o n  
a l low long-term planning by t h e  u s e r s ,  and thus  encourage economically 
e f f i c i e n t  dec i s ions ,  bu t  may be  expensive f o r  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  r ecap tu re  
( s i n c e  they  must be bought back) i n  comparison t o  short- term r i g h t s  (which 
may simply no t  be r e i s sued  when they e x p i r e ) .  One p o s s i b l e  way t o  address  
t h i s  t r adeo f f  i s  t o  i s s u e  base r i g h t s  i n  a  s taggered  p a t t e r n  over n  years  
such t h a t  one-nth of t h e  r i g h t s  e x p i r e  i n  any g iven  year .  By t h i s  method, 
t h e  a u t h o r i t y  may reduce t h e  number of r i g h t s  e x t a n t  by a s  much a s  one-nth 
per  year ,  simply by i s su ing  fewer r i g h t s  than  have expi red  [ f o r  a  d i s cus s ion  
of t h i s  mechanism a s  appl ied  t o  p o l l u t i o n  r i g h t s ,  see  David, e t  a l . ,  19801. 
I f  permits  were v a l i d ,  say,  f o r  twenty yea r s ,  they would cover most of t h e  
economic l i f e t i m e  of most p l a n t  equipment, and would s t i l l  g ive  t h e  
a u t h o r i t y  t h e  oppor tun i ty  t o  r e c a l l  a s  many a s  f i v e  percent  of t h e  permi ts  
i n  any year .  A l t e r n a t i v e  l i fe -spans  f o r  water  permi ts  have been examined by 
Ausness [I9771 . 
1.1 BASE-RIGHTS DEFINITIONS 
While t h e r e  a r e  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  an  i n f i n i t e  number of a l t e r n a t i v e  ways 
t o  de f ine  base r i g h t s  so  a s  t o  r e l a t e  a v a i l a b l e  water  s u p p l i e s  t o  i nd iv idua l  
users '  permi t ted  withdrawals  o r  consumption, t h i s  r e p o r t  w i l l  concent ra te  
upon two gene ra l  types which a r e  f e l t  t o  have t h e  most i n t u i t i v e  appeal .  The 
r i g h t s  d e f i n i t i o n s  which a r e  examined most c l o s e l y  a r e  1 )  r i g h t s  a l lowing 
p r i o r i t i z e d  use  of f i x e d  amounts of water and 2) r i g h t s  e n t i t l i n g  u s e r s  t o  
f i x e d  f r a c t i o n s  of t h e  a v a i l a b l e  f low,  wi th  a l l  u s e r s  having equal  p r i o r i t y .  
These types of r i g h t s  a r e  def ined  r e s p e c t i v e l y  below. 
To s imp l i fy  t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  it is i m p l i c i t l y  assumed here  t h a t  t h e  
u s e r s  a r e  drawing water  from a c e n t r a l  source--such a s  a  lake--whose supply 
v a r i e s  over  time bu t  not  over space. The l o c a t i o n a l  i s s u e s  a s s o c i a t e d  with 
a  geographic d i s t r i b u t i o n  of u se r s  over a  d e n d r i t i c  s t ream system a r e  
examined i n  Sec t ion  2. 
1.1.1 P r i o r i t i z e d  Steady Use Bigh ts  (PSUR's) 
PSUR's, which a r e  r i g h t s  t o  p r i o r i t i z e d  consumption of f i x e d  amounts 
of wa t e r ,  a r e  s i m i l a r  i n  s p i r i t  t o  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t i v e  r i g h t s  of t h e  wes te rn  
Uni ted S t a t e s .  They a r e  def ined  i n  terms of two parameters :  t h e  s i z e  of t h e  
r i g h t ,  Si, which denotes  t h e  maximum f low which may be  t aken  by t h e  u s e r ,  
and t h e  p r i o r i t y  of t h e  r i g h t  which i s  r ep re sen t ed  i n  t h i s  r e p o r t  by t h e  
a v a i l a b l e  s t reamflow,  ji, which must be exceeded b e f o r e  t h e  r i g h t  may be 
exe r c i s ed .  Th is  streamflow i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  t h e  " j u n i o r i t y "  of u se r  i's 
r i g h t .  Thus, f o r  example, a  z e r o - j u n i o r i t y  r i g h t  has t h e  ve ry  h ighes t  
p r i o r i t y  because no u s e r s  precede it i n  p r i o r i t y .  I f  qi, i s  def ined  a s  t h e  
a v a i l a b l e  f low a t  t ime n ,  and qin a s  t h e  pe rmi t t ed  consumption of u se r  i i n  
time per iod  n ,  t h e  PSUR may be s t a t e d  mathemat ica l ly  a s :  
F igu re  1-1-A shows how t h i s  mechanism a l l o c a t e s  f low t o  v a r i o u s  u s e r s .  
The v e r t i c a l  widths  of t h e  h o r i z o n t a l  bands r e p r e s e n t  t h e  q i n  a t  v a r i o u s  
f lows .  The lower edge of each band r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  corresponding user 's  
j u n i o r i t y .  The cond i t i on  t h a t  qin 5 q n  i s m a i n t a i n e d  r e g a r d l e s s  of t h e  
ass ignments  of j and S t o  t h e  u s e r s .  
1.1.2 F r a c t i o n a l  Flow Righ ts  (FFR's) 
The second type of r i g h t  examined h e r e  e n t i t l e s  u s e r s  t o  a  f r a c t i o n  of 
t h e  a v a i l a b l e  flow; a l l  u s e r s  have equa l  p r i o r i t y  under t h i s  system. The 
d e f i n i n g  equa t i on  is  
Th i s  system is  i l l u s t r a t e d  by F igu re  1-1-B. 
Note t h a t  under e i t h e r  t h e  PSUR o r  FFR system, a v a i l a b l e  f low could 
r e p r e s e n t  t o t a l  f low i n  t h e  s t ream o r  t o t a l  f low minus some f i x e d  amount o r  
f r a c t i o n  r e se rved  f o r  ins t ream f low needs.  Also,  examinat ion of F igu re s  
1-1-A and 1-1-B should sugges t  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t  many o t h e r  approaches 
r e l a t i n g  a v a i l a b l e  f low t o  a l lowable  use  b e s i d e s  t h e  PSUR and FFR 
d e f i n i t i o n s ,  e .g . ,  non l i nea r  d e f i n i n g  f u n c t i o n s  o r  a  combination of t h e  FFR 
and PSUR approaches.  F igu re s  1-2 and 1-3 i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  l a t t e r  op t i on .  
F igu re  1-2 r e p r e s e n t s  a  c a se  where u s e r s  a r e  p r i o r i t i z e d  on a  first-come- 
f i r s t - s e r v e  b a s i s .  A c e r t a i n  q u a n t i t y  of wate r  i s  r e se rved  f o r  i n s t r e am 
f low needs.  Three u s e r s  (A, B, and C ) ,  who e x i s t e d  a t  t h e  t ime t h a t  t h e  
r e g u l a t i o n  was enac ted ,  sha r e  accord ing  t o  t h e  FFR system up t o  some 
e s t a b l i s h e d  s a t u r a t i o n  flow. A f t e r  those  t h r e e  u s e r s  a r e  s a t i s f i e d  
( s a t u r a t e d ) ,  new u s e r s  a r e  s a t i s f i e d  i n  o r d e r  of d a t e  of a p p l i c a t i o n .  F igu re  
1-3 r e p r e s e n t s  p r i o r i t i z a t i o n  accord ing  t o  type of u se ,  w i t h  r e s e rved  f low 
coming f i r s t ,  municipal  use  second, i n d u s t r i a l  use  t h i r d ,  and i r r i g a t i o n  
f o u r t h .  Users  w i t h i n  a  ca tegory  s h a r e  on an FFR b a s i s  up t o  some e s t a b l i s h e d  
s a t u r a t i o n  f low f o r  t h e  ca tegory .  
The manner i n  which base  r i g h t s  a r e  d e f i n e d  may a f f e c t  t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  
of t h e  permit  system. P r e d i c t i n g  which system encourages  t h e  most e f f i c i e n t  
a l l o c a t i o n s  i s  d i f f i c u l t ,  however, a s  t h i s  p r e d i c t i o n  depends upon t h e  
s p e c i f i c  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  wa te r  supp ly  and u s e r s .  I n  some c a s e s ,  
p r i o r i t i z e d  a c c e s s  t o  s t e a d y  f lows may be  p r e f e r r e d ;  i n  o t h e r s ,  a c c e s s  t o  
d i f f e r e n t  f r a c t i o n s  of f low w i t h  e q u a l  p r i o r i t y  may be more e f f i c i e n t .  
I n s i g h t s  i n t o  t r a d e - o f f s  between t h e s e  t y p e s  of sys tems a r e  developed i n  
t h e  c o n t e x t  of a  s p e c i f i c  a p p l i c a t i o n  below. Note t h a t  s p o t  r i g h t s  t r a d e s  
under e i t h e r  system would t end  t o  a l l o w  e q u i v a l e n t  ex post outcomes t o  be 
a t t a i n e d .  
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Figure 1-3 D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  Consumption w i t h  P r i o r i t i e s  Set 
by Type o f  Use 
2- LOCATIONAL ISSUES 
Water a v a i l a b i l i t y  g e n e r a l l y  v a r i e s  over  space a s  w e l l  a s  over  t ime. 
There a r e  u s u a l l y  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a l lowing  
u n r e s t r i c t e d  t r a n s f e r s  of wa te r  r i g h t s  from one l o c a t i o n  t o  a n o t h e r ,  even 
w i t h i n  a  b a s i n .  T h i s  r e p o r t  f o c u s e s  on two a l t e r n a t i v e  approaches  f o r  
a d d r e s s i n g  l o c a t i o n a l  i s s u e s .  One may b e  b e s t  s u i t e d  t o  t h e  downstream 
r e a c h e s  of t h e  b a s i n ,  where w a t e r  and t h e  economic a c t i v i t y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
i t s  use  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  c o n c e n t r a t e d ;  t h e  o t h e r  i s  b e t t e r  s u i t e d  t o  t h e  
upst ream r e a c h e s  where b o t h  a r e  more d i s p e r s e d .  We r e f e r  t o  t h e  two 
s t r u c t u r e s  a s  t h e  l e n t i c  and l o t i c  s t r u c t u r e s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  borrowing 
terms from b i o l o g y  which deno te  l a k e - l i k e  and s t ream- l ike  ecosystems. The 
l e n t i c  sys tem w i l l  be shown t o  be a  s p e c i a l  c a s e  of t h e  l o t i c  system. 
2.1 THE LENTIC SYSTEM 
Under a  l e n t i c  system t h e  u s e r s  a r e  subdivided i n t o  groups  o r  zones,  
u s u a l l y  accord ing  t o  geograph ic  l o c a t i o n  ( f o r  example, a  l a k e  might be a  
s i n g l e  zone) ,  and a  s e p a r a t e  market i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  each  zone. This  
s t r u c t u r e  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  a group of u s e r s  on a  l a k e ,  
impoundment, o r  e s t u a r y ,  b u t  would a l s o  s e r v e  f o r  a  s e c t i o n  of f r e e -  
f lowing  r i v e r  where a l l  of t h e  u s e r s  a r e  l o c a t e d  on o r  n e a r  t h e  main stem. 
Water r i g h t s  such a s  FFR'S o r  PSUR's a r e  i s s u e d ,  and may t h e n  be  e x e r c i s e d  
o r  t r a d e d  w i t h i n  t h e  zone. The a v a i l a b l e  supp ly  of wa te r  i n  each  zone i s  
d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  f low e n t e r i n g  t h e  zone minus t h e  minimum f low requ i rement .  
Under t h e  l e n t i c  s t r u c t u r e ,  t h e r e  a r e  no r e s t r i c t i o n s  on t h e  t r a n s f e r  of 
r i g h t s  w i t h i n  a  zone, s o  t h a t  a  g i v e n  r i g h t  a l l o w s  t h e  same consumption by a  
u s e r  a t  any l o c a t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  zone. 
Because of t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  l e n t i c  system, t h e  d e l i n e a t i o n  of zones 
w i l l  normal ly  b e  governed by e x i s t i n g  p h y s i c a l  and p o l i t i c a l  boundar ies  
such a s  t h e  l o c a t i o n s  of dams and s t a t e  l i n e s .  However, t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
a u t h o r i t y  might o c c a s i o n a l l y  c o n s i d e r  t h e  o p t i o n  of s u b d i v i d i n g  l a r g e r  
zones i n t o  s m a l l e r  ones .  This  wou1.d make w a t e r  from t h e  zone's i n t e r m e d i a t e  
t r i b u t a r i e s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  downstream u s e r s  w i t h i n  t h e  zone. However, t h e  
a u t h o r i t y  w i l l  b e  faced w i t h  a  t r a d e o f f ,  s i n c e  t h e  t y p e  of a l l o c a t i o n  
mechanism used may l e s s  e f f e c t i v e l y  d i s c o u r a g e  a t t e m p t s  t o  manipu la te  t h e  
market when t h e  number of p a r t i c i p a n t s  is  smal l .  
There a r e  s e v e r a l  o p t i o n s  f o r  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between zones.  The 
o p t i o n  which i s  most e a s i l y  a d m i n i s t e r e d ,  and which t h e r e f o r e  may be viewed 
a s  a  " d e f a u l t "  o p t i o n ,  i s  t o  make t h e  f low from ungauged t r i b u t a r i e s  f e e d i n g  
each zone u n a v a i l a b l e  t o  u s e r s  w i t h i n  t h e  zone, b u t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  u s e r s  i n  
t h e  n e x t  zone downstream ( a s  it f lows p a s t  t h e  gauge d i v i d i n g  t h e  two) .  
There w i l l  u s u a l l y  b e  a  n e t  e f f i c i e n c y  g a i n  by a l lowing  i n d i v i d u a l  u s e r s  t o  
purchase  p e r m i t s  i n  zones upst ream of t h e i r  wi thdrawal  l o c a t i o n s .  A u s e r  
e x e r c i s i n g  t h i s  o p t i o n  would be t r e a t e d  by t h e  zone a u t h o r i t i e s  involved 
a s  though he were l o c a t e d  i n  t h e  upst ream zone. H i s  a l l o t m e n t  would be  s e t  
a s i d e  and a l lowed t o  f low downstream t o  him, and would b e  deducted from t h e  
zona l  in f low a t  each zone boundary between h i s  l o c a t i o n  and t h e  l o c a t i o n  of 
h i s  pe rmi t .  A u s e r  would n o t  b e  a l lowed t o  buy a  pe rmi t  i n  a  zone 
downstream of h i s  wi thdrawal  l o c a t i o n  u n l e s s  he  in tended  t o  p i p e  it back 
upst ream t o  h i s  l o c a t i o n  of use .  
2.2 THE LOTIC SYSTEM 
The l o t i c  pe rmi t  system i s  des igned t o  a d d r e s s  t h e  c o m p l e x i t i e s  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  u s i n g  t r a n s f e r a b l e  p e r m i t s  i n  d e n d r i t i c  s t r e a m  systems. 
Under t h e  l o t i c  approach,  a  zone may c o n s i s t  of a  whole watershed o r  a  
p o r t i o n  of one. Water from a l l  t r i b u t a r i e s  i n  t h e  zone i s  i n  some s e n s e  
a v a i l a b l e  t o  u s e r s ,  though t h e  a l l o w a b l e  wi thdrawal  by a  g i v e n  u s e r  may 
depend on t h e  w a t e r  a v a i l a b l e  t o  o t h e r  u s e r s  b o t h  upst ream and downstream. 
The approach i s  based upon t h e  n o t i o n  of " c o n s t r a i n i n g  p o i n t s , "  which 
a r e  p o i n t s  on t h e  s t r e a m  system above which u s e r s  must reduce t h e i r  
consumption i n  o r d e r  t o  m a i n t a i n  i n s t r e a m  f lows.  I n  t h e  c a s e  of FFR's, 
u s e r s '  r e d u c t i o n s  a r e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  t h e  r i g h t s  t h e y  i n i t i a l l y  ho ld .  Under 
a  PSUR system,  r e d u c t i o n s  a r e  based on t h e  p r i o r i t y  ( j u n i o r i t y )  of t h e  
r i g h t s .  
The f o l l o w i n g  i s  an  example of a  l o t i c  FFR system. Consider  t h e  b a s i n  
shown i n  F i g u r e  2-1. The ownership of r i p a r i a n  l and  i s  d i s t r i b u t e d  among 
u s e r s  A th rough  H.  There a r e  f lowgauges a t  P o i n t s  1, 2 ,  and 3 o n l y  ( f o r  
t h e  t ime being i g n o r e  P o i n t s  4 ,  5 ,  and 6 ) .  The i n i t i a l  r i g h t s  ho ld ings  by 
t h e  e i g h t  u s e r s  a r e  g i v e n  a s  f o l l o w s :  
Example 1 
User s i z e  
The FFR s i z e s  imply t h e  r a t i o s  of a l l o w a b l e  wi thdrawals  among t h e  u s e r s  
d u r i n g  t imes  when t h e r e  a r e  s h o r t a g e s  w i t h i n  t h e  zone. Since  they  add t o  
loo%,  t h e y  may b e  viewed a s  t h e  pe rcen tages  of t h e  supp ly  measured a t  P o i n t  
1 which a r e  a l l o c a t e d  t o  each u s e r ,  b u t  o n l y  when P o i n t  1 i s  t h e  o n l y  p o i n t  
c o n s t r a i n i n g .  I n  o r d e r  t o  m a i n t a i n  f lows when t h e r e  a r e  s h o r t a g e s  upstream, 
t h e  consumption r a t e s  w i l l  n o t  always be  i n  t h e s e  p r o p o r t i o n s .  At t h e s e  
t imes  c e r t a i n  s u b s e t s  of t h e  e i g h t  w i l l  reduce consumption i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  
t h e i r  t o t a l  FFR's. For example, i f  t h e r e  were a  s h o r t a g e  a t  P o i n t  2 ,  Users  
A, B, and C cou ld  no t  consume 20,  10 ,  and 15% of t h e  f low a v a i l a b l e  a t  P o i n t  
1 and s t i l l  m a i n t a i n  i n s t r e a m  f l o w s  above P o i n t  2. I n  t h i s  c a s e  under t h e  
l o t i c  system, Users  A, B, and C would be  r e q u i r e d  t o  c u r t a i l  t h e i r  
wi thdrawals  i n  t h e  r a t i o  of 20:10:15 t o  m a i n t a i n  f l o w  a t  P o i n t  2. Likewise ,  
i f  P o i n t  3 exper ienced  a  s h o r t a g e ,  Users  D and E would have t o  c u r t a i l  
t h e i r  consumption i n  t h e  r a t i o  of 20:lO i n  o r d e r  t o  m a i n t a i n  f low a t  t h a t  
p o i n t  . 
The o p e r a t i o n  of t h e  l o t i c  FFR system may be summarized a s  f o l l o w s .  
Each 1% FFR e n t i t l e s  a  u s e r  t o  a n  equa l  pe rcen tage  of t h e  t o t a l  f low a t  t h e  
most downstream p o i n t  of t h e  watershed u n l e s s  t h e r e  is  n o t  enough w a t e r  
above o r  below him t o  pe rmi t  equa l  s h a r i n g  by o t h e r  u s e r s  ho ld ing  FFR's. I n  
such a  c a s e ,  t h e  u s e r  r e c e i v e s  t h e  l a r g e s t  amount f e a s i b l e ,  g i v e n  h i s  
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consumption cannot  be a l lowed a f t e r  F's r i g h t  i s  t r a n s f e r r e d .  Thus, t h e r e  
w i l l  remain a p o r t i o n  of t h e  o r i g i n a l  r i g h t  which t h e  buyer cannot  u s e  which 
may be r e t a i n e d  by t h e  s e l l e r  o r  s o l d  by e i t h e r  p a r t y  t o  a  t h i r d  p a r t y .  For 
t h i s  example t h e  r e s i d u a l  is t h e  r i g h t  t o  withdraw 15% of t h e  t o t a l  f low 
p a s s i n g  P o i n t s  4 ,  5,  and 6  a t  t imes  when P o i n t  2  i s  b ind ing .  
Each user ' s  o r i g i n a l l y - i s s u e d  r i g h t  may be  thought  of as being 
s e p a r a t e d  i n t o  r i g h t s  c o n t i n g e n t  on each p o s s i b l e  combinat ion of 
c o n s t r a i n i n g  p o i n t s  w i t h i n  t h e  zone. For example, User D's r i g h t  may be 
s e p a r a t e d  i n t o  one r i g h t  which e n t i t l e s  him t o  20% of t h e  f low e n t e r i n g  t h e  
e n t i r e  b a s i n  when P o i n t  1 o n l y  i s  c o n s t r a i n i n g ,  a n o t h e r  r i g h t  e n t i t l i n g  him 
t o  20/(20+10)  = 67% of t h e  f low e n t e r i n g  t h e  subbas in  above P o i n t  3  when 
P o i n t  3  is  c o n s t r a i n i n g ,  and 20/(20+10+15+5+5)= 36.4% of t h e  f l o w  e n t e r i n g  
t h e  b a s i n  ( a p a r t  from t h e  subbas in  above P o i n t  2 )  when P o i n t  2  and P o i n t  1 
a r e  c o n s t r a i n i n g .  The t r a n s f e r  of r i g h t s  under t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  j u s t  
d i s c u s s e d  may be  viewed a s  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of one of t h e  s e p a r a t e d  r i g h t s  
w i t h o u t  t h e  o t h e r s .  By combining such s e p a r a t e d  r i g h t s  w i t h  newly-purchased 
r i g h t s ,  u s e r s  may t a i l o r  r i g h t s  t o  s u i t  t h e i r  needs .  Thus, f o r  example, D 
could  expand h i s  FFR holding t o  y i e l d  approx imate ly  t h e  same as a  25% r i g h t  
i n i t i a l l y  i s s u e d  t o  him by 1 )buy ing  h a l f  of E's r i g h t  under a l l  s t r eam 
c o n d i t i o n s ,  o r  2 ) f i r s t  buying H's r i g h t  t o  t a k e  5% of t h e  w a t e r  f lowing i n t o  
t h e  whole zone when P o i n t  1 a l o n e  is  c o n s t r a i n i n g  and t o  t a k e  
5/(20+10+15+5+5) = 9.1% of t h e  w a t e r  f lowing i n t o  t h e  r e s t  of t h e  b a s i n  when 
P o i n t  2  i s  c o n s t r a i n i n g ,  and t h e n  buying,  from E,  t h e  r i g h t  t o  t a k e  
5/(20+10)=16.7% of t h e  wa te r  f lowing above P o i n t  3  when t h a t  p o i n t  i s  
c o n s t r a i n i n g .  The remainder of H's r i g h t ,  which is  t h e  r i g h t  t o  t a k e  
5/(20+10+15+15+5+5)= 7.1% of t h e  f low i n  t h e  r e s t  of t h e  b a s i n  when P o i n t  3  
i s  c o n s t r a i n i n g  could be r e t a i n e d  by H o r  s o l d  t o  someone l o c a t e d  e l sewhere  
i n  t h e  b a s i n .  
T r a n s f e r s  of l o t i c  PSUR's may a l s o  impose e x t e r n a l  c o s t s  ( o r  b e n e f i t s )  
on u s e r s ,  depending on how t h e  r i g h t s  a r e  d e f i n e d .  I f  a  t r a n s f e r r e d  PSUR 
were t o  c o n f e r  upon t h e  buyer t h e  same s e t  of consumption r i g h t s  a s  i f  i t  
had been o r i g i n a l l y  i s s u e d  t o  him w i t h  t h e  same s i z e  and j u n i o r i t y ,  u s e r s  
n e a r  t h e  buyer ( b o t h  upst ream and downstream of him) would be h u r t ,  because  
l e s s  w a t e r  t h a n  p r e v i o u s l y  would be a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e s e  u s e r s .  S i m i l a r l y  
u n r e s t r i c t e d  t r a n s f e r s  would t end  t o  h e l p  u s e r s  n e a r  t h e  s e l l e r ,  because  
more wate r  may p o t e n t i a l l y  become a v a i l a b l e  t o  them. Because of t h e s e  
p o t e n t i a l  e x t e r n a l i t i e s ,  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  may wish t o  d e f i n e  and subd iv ide  t h e  
l o t i c  PSUR's so  t h a t  t h e s e  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  do n o t  occur .  
One approach t o  t h i s  problem would be  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  l o t i c  PSUR's i n  a  
manner analogous t o  t h a t  d e s c r i b e d  f o r  t h e  FFR's above. A t r a n s f e r  of a  
r i g h t  i n  t h i s  c a s e  would e n t i t l e  t h e  buyer t o  no more w a t e r  t h a n  would be 
a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  s e l l e r  i f  he had k e p t  t h e  r i g h t .  Thus, i n  F i g .  2 ,  i f  C's 
r i g h t  were t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  H ,  i t  would e n t i t l e  H t o  20 c f s  a f t e r  F  has  been 
s a t i s f i e d ,  b u t  o n l y  a s  long a s  P o i n t  1 i s  t h e  o n l y  p o i n t  c o n s t r a i n i n g .  Once 
t h e  f low a t  P o i n t  2  f a l l s  below 20 c f s ,  H w i l l  have t o  c u r t a i l  u s e ,  
r e g a r d l e s s  of how much wate r  is  a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  channel  a t  H's l o c a t i o n .  
To a l l o w  H n o t  t o  be  bound by t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o r i g i n a l l y  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n  of C's r i g h t  would impose e x t e r n a l  c o s t s  on D ,  E ,  and G as w e l l  
a s  p o s s i b l y  imposing c o s t s  on u s e r s  downstream of H. The v a l u e  of t h e  r i g h t  
a f t e r  subsequent  t r a n s f e r s  under t h i s  approach might be d e f i n e d  by t h e  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  be  based e i t h e r  on t h e  v a l u e  of t h e  r i g h t  a t  H o r  i t s  o r i g i n a l  
v a l u e  a t  C. 
A second approach which avo ids  imposing e x t e r n a l  c o s t s  on u s e r s  would 
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3- MARKET AND DISTRIBUTION PROCEDURES 
I n  designing a  t r a n s f e r a b l e  r i g h t s  program, dec i s ions  must be made 
about methods f o r  both t h e  i n i t i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  and subsequent exchange of 
r i g h t s .  A fundamental choice i s  between procedures  t h a t  d i s t r i b u t e  r i g h t s  
i n i t i a l l y  without  r equ i r ing  payments and procedures  t h a t  involve s a l e s  of 
r i g h t s  t o  u s e r s  by the  governmental a u t h o r i t y .  With r e s p e c t  t o  exchange 
procedures ,  a  fundamental choice is  between c e n t r a l i z e d  and decen t r a l i zed  
exchanges. This  s e c t i o n  examines t h e  i s s u e s  a s soc i a t ed  w i th  t he se  choices .  
3 .1  INITIAL DISTRIBUTION PROCEDURES 
I n  cases  where t h e r e  a r e  e x p l i c i t  o r  i m p l i c i t  water  use r i g h t s  e x i s t i n g  
p r i o r  t o  implementation of a  t r a n s f e r a b l e  r i g h t s  system, t h e  governmental 
a u t h o r i t y  might wish t o  implement some s o r t  of f r e e  i n i t i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
procedure f o r  t r a n s f e r a b l e  r i g h t s .  I n  both r i p a r i a n  and a p p r o p r i a t i v e  
s t a t e s ,  f o r  example, u s e r s  p r e s e n t l y  have proper ty  r i g h t s  t o  water .  I n  
a p p r o p r i a t i v e  s t a t e s  t he se  r i g h t s  a r e  somewhat e x p l i c i t l y  def ined;  i n  
r i p a r i a n  s t a t e s ,  l e s s  wel l -def ined,  but  neve r the l e s s  r e a l ,  p roper ty  r i g h t s  
e x i s t  and a r e  a t  l e a s t  p a r t i a l l y  c a p i t a l i z e d  i n t o  t h e  va lue  of r i p a r i a n  
land. This suppor t s  t he  no t ion  of f r e e  i n i t i a l  a l l o c a t i o n  of r i g h t s  
according t o  t h e  s t a t u s  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  I n  r i p a r i a n  s t a t e s ,  however, 
t h e r e  i s  t h e  problem t h a t  t h e  r i g h t s  held i n i t i a l l y  a r e  no t  wel l -def ined.  
A l l  r i p a r i a n  landowners have r i g h t s  which a r e  u s u a l l y  thought of a s  "equal" 
i n  some vague sense ,  and which have been i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  a l lowing l a r g e l y  
un l imi ted  pass-through use  but l im i t ed  consumptive use ( u s u a l l y  r e f e r r e d  t o  
a s  "reasonable" u se )  [ s ee ,  e.g., H i r s h l e i f e r ,  e t  a l . ,  1969 o r  Ausness, 1977, 
199-201 ] . 
I n  such reg ions ,  it might be app rop r i a t e  t o  cons ider  f r e e  i n i t i a l  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of homogeneous ly-def ined (consumption) r i g h t s  such a s  FFR's . 
An important ques t ion ,  however, i s  how much water each use r  should rece ive .  
S t r i c t  adherence t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  a l l  r i p a r i a n  landowners a r e  equal  
might imply a l l o c a t i n g  each an equal  percentage of t h e  r i p a r i a n  water .  
A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  it might be considered app rop r i a t e  t o  a l l o c a t e  flow i n  
propor t ion  t o  some measure of t h e  s i z e  of t h e  landowner and/or  h i s  previous 
l e v e l  of water  use.  S ize  could be measured by parameters such a s  t h e  a r e a  of 
t h e  r i p a r i a n  land p a r c e l ,  i t s  length along t h e  stream, t h e  l o c a t i o n  of t h e  
u s e r ,  t h e  average o r  average dry-period f low i n  t h e  channel a t  t h a t  
p o s i t i o n ,  e t c .  A f a i r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of r i g h t s  could t h e r e f o r e  be based on a  
formula which r e l a t e s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  va lue  of the  r i g h t  t o  one o r  more of 
t he se  parameters.  (Ausness [1977, 199-2011, however, d i s c u s s e s  some of the  
l e g a l  precedents  regard ing  these  measures and t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  wi th  
determining "reasonable" sha re s  i n  any manner bes ides  case-by-case 
ad jud ica t ion .  ) 
There a r e  a l s o  major d i f f i c u l t i e s  a s soc i a t ed  wi th  f r e e  i n i t i a l  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of PSUR's i n  r i p a r i a n  r eg ions ,  e i t h e r  under a  l e n t i c  o r  l o t i c  
system. It i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d i s t r i b u t e  t h e s e  r i g h t s  i n i t i a l l y  according t o  
an e q u i t a b l e  formula c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  t he  r i p a r i a n  doc t r i ne .  The s i z e  of t h e  
r i g h t  could conceivably be determined by t h e  same s o r t  of c r i t e r i o n  used t o  
s e t  t h e  s i z e s  of FFR's, bu t  t h e r e  would be no equ i t ab l e  way t o  s e t  
j u n i o r i t i e s .  I n  a p p r o p r i a t i v e  s t a t e s ,  a  system of p r i o r i t i z e d  r i g h t s  may 
a l r eady  have been placed i n t o  e f f e c t .  Under t he se  circumstances,  a  system of 
PSUR's which d u p l i c a t e s  t h e  s t a t u s  =migh t  be app rop r i a t e .  
Clea r ly ,  t he  choice of a  b a s i s  f o r  i n i t i a l l y  d i s t r i b u t i n g  r i g h t s  
involves d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  i s sues .  R e a l i s t i c a l l y ,  t hese  i s sues  w i l l  l i k e l y  be 
t h e  sub jec t  of p o l i t i c a l  debate .  
3.2 AUCTION AND EXCHANGE PROCEDURES 
The second broad type of i n i t i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  procedure i s  t h e  s a l e  of 
r i g h t s  by the  government t o  u se r s ,  presumably through some s o r t  of auc t ion .  
This approach involves a  t r a n s f e r  of revenue t o  t he  government by use r s ,  
a l though it might be poss ib l e  t o  refund a l l  o r  p a r t  of users '  payments. The 
auc t ion  procedures used f o r  c e n t r a l i z e d  exchanges may be s i m i l a r  t o  those 
used t o  s e l l  t he  r i g h t s  i n i t i a l l y .  
Len t i c  FFR's a r e  homogeneous goods; t h i s  renders  them r e l a t i v e l y  easy 
t o  a l l o c a t e  e f f i c i e n t l y  through a  c e n t r a l i z e d  auc t ion .  A number of such 
auc t ions  have been examined f o r  a l l o c a t i o n  of p o l l u t i o n  r i g h t s  [ see ,  f o r  
example, David, e t  a1  . , 1980; Lyon, 19821 . Lent ic  FFR's have a  s i m i l a r  
s t r u c t u r e  t o  p o l l u t i o n  r i g h t s ,  and the  reader  i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  t hese  papers 
f o r  d e t a i l s .  
However, t h e r e  a r e  d e f i n i t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which complicate t he  
i n i t i a l  s a l e s  and subsequent exchanges under t h e  l e n t i c  PSUR, l o t i c  PSUR, 
and l o t i c  FFR systems. PSUR's a r e  heterogeneous goods (no two a r e  i d e n t i c a l  
because they have d i f f e r e n t  p r i o r i t i e s ) ,  and t h e  va lue  of both types of 
l o t i c  r i g h t s  depends on t h e  s e t  of r i g h t s  held by o the r  u se r s .  
Consider a  l e n t i c  PSUR case where m d i sc re t e ly - s i zed  r i g h t s  wi th  
contiguous l e v e l s  of j u n i o r i t y  a r e  being a l l o c a t e d .  A maximally e f f i c i e n t  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  could r e q u i r e  each bidder  t o  submit a s  many a s  2m bids  (one b id  
f o r  each poss ib l e  s e t  of a l l o c a t i o n s  t o  him). With n  b idde r s ,  t h e  
a u t h o r i t y  would f ace  a  packing problem where t h e r e  a r e  nm d i f f e r e n t  ways t o  
a l l o c a t e  t he  r i g h t s .  
Under a  l o t i c  PSUR system, t h e r e  a r e  a l s o  nm d i f f e r e n t  ways t o  a l l o c a t e  
t h e  r i g h t s ,  but optimal a l l o c a t i o n  could r e q u i r e  a s  many a s  nm b ids  t o  be 
submitted by each u s e r ,  one f o r  each poss ib l e  combination of a l l o c a t i o n s  t o  
himself and a l l  o the r  u se r s .  
The s i t u a t i o n  i s  only s l i g h t l y  l e s s  complex i n  the  case of l o t i c  FFR's. 
I n  t h i s  case l e t  m r ep re sen t  t he  t o t a l  number of d i scre te -s ized  FFR's (e .g . ,  
100 FFR's of 1% each)  i n  a  market of n  b idders .  It can be shown t h a t  t he  
maximum number of d i s t i n c t  a l l o c a t i o n s ,  A, (and, hence, t he  number of b ids  
per  b idder )  equals  
where h=min(m,n). 
n  The combination (i) r ep re sen t s  t he  number of d i s t i n c t  i - tup les  of 
i bidders .  The combination r e p r e s e n t s  t he  number of d i s t i n c t  ways t o  
i-1 a l l o c a t e  m o b j e c t s  among each i - tup le  of bidders .  While i n  small  
markets ,  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  process  f o r  t h e s e  r i g h t s  might be t r a c t a b l e ,  a s  t h e  
s i z e  of t he  market grows, t h e  number of combinations i nc reases  r a p i d l y .  For 
example, i f  n=m=3, A=10; bu t  i f  n=m=8, A=6435. 
C lea r ly ,  complex a u c t i o n  procedures must be considered i n  order  t o  
a l l o c a t e  t he se  t h r e e  types of r i g h t s  op t imal ly  under a l l  c i rcumstances.  Of 
course ,  t h e  procedure may be l e s s  complex i f  it  is known t h a t  t h e  b i d s  have 
mathematical p r o p e r t i e s  which a l low a  s imp l i f i ed  a l l o c a t i o n  procedure.  For 
example, t h e  packing problem is s i m p l i f i e d  i f  b idders  who have high va lues  
f o r  r i g h t s  a t  one l e v e l  of j u n i o r i t y  have high va lues  f o r  r i g h t s  a t  a l l  
l e v e l s  of j u n i o r i t y .  Also, i f  t he  d e n d r i t i c  system is no t  h igh ly  branched, 
then  t h e  number of d i s t i n c t  combinations of r i g h t s  under t h e  l o t i c  FFR 
system w i l l  be much l e s s  than t h e  maximum ind ica t ed  above. 
Despi te  t he se  s imp l i fy ing  f a c t o r s ,  however, t h e  c o s t s  of optimal 
packing procedures  t o  both b idders  and t h e  a u t h o r i t y  may outweigh t h e i r  
b e n e f i t s ,  and a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  a  s i n g l e  simultaneous exchange may be 
considered.  For i n s t ance ,  PSUR's might be a l l o c a t e d  by s e q u e n t i a l  auc t ions  
i n  which d i s c r e t e l y  s i z e d  r i g h t s  a r e  s o l d  i n  o rde r  of decreas ing  p r i o r i t y .  
Trades between two o r  more p a r t i e s  could then be allowed t o  c o r r e c t  any 
i n e f f i c i e n c i e s .  A l o t i c  FFR system might be implemented by a  f r e e  i n i t i a l  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of r i g h t s  based on land ownership, with two-party t r a d e s  
allowed fol lowing t h i s  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  
It i s  worthwhile t o  no te  t h a t  many e x i s t i n g  markets ( inc lud ing  t h e  r e a l  
e s t a t e  market)  r e g u l a r l y  d i s t r i b u t e  heterogeneous goods a t  a  high,  i f  no t  
maximal, e f f i c i e n c y .  I f  t r a n s a c t i o n s  c o s t s  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  low, one would 
expect  t he  equi l ib r ium outcome of t r a d e s  between two o r  more p a r t i e s  t o  
approach the  opt imal  packing s o l u t i o n .  
4- THE LITTLE WABASH BASIN DATA 
Empir ical  p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  market s t r u c t u r e s  d i scussed  above were 
examined us ing  a s imulated case  s tudy of t h e  L i t t l e  Wabash Basin which i s  
loca ted  i n  sou theas t e rn  I l l i n o i s  ( s e e  F igu re  4-1). The economy of t h e  
r eg ion  depends on a g r i c u l t u r a l  and s e v e r a l  smal l  i n d u s t r i a l  and 
manufacturing a c t i v i t i e s .  The L i t t l e  Wabash River is  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  source 
of water  supply i n  t he  bas in ,  a l though l imi t ed  groundwater can be found i n  
t he  shal low unconsol idated a q u i f e r s  along t h e  a 1  l u v i a l  r i v e r  bed. The 
average d i scharge  below Clay Ci ty ,  which is loca ted  i n  t h e  c e n t r a l  a r ea  of 
t he  bas in ,  i s  881 c f s  (24.95 crns) [U.S. Geological  Survey, 19801. Although 
occas iona l  d e f i c i t s  occur ,  e x i s t i n g  su r f ace  water  use  i n  t h e  bas in  (roughly 
4.8 crns [ s ee  Kirk e t  a l . ,  19791 ) is  smal l  compared t o  a v a i l a b l e  flows. 
Demand f o r  water  i n  t h e  reg ion  is  p r i m a r i l y  confined t o  municipal use  and, 
t o  a l e s s e r  e x t e n t ,  o i l  product ion by water  f lood  ope ra t i ons .  
I r r i g a t i o n  of crops (approximately 0.02 clns i n  1978 [ s ee  Kirk e t  a l . ,  
19791) i s  p r e s e n t l y  i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  However, most s o i l s  i n  t h e  bas in  belong 
t o  t he  Cisne and Ava-Bluford-Wynoose s o i l  a s s o c i a t i o n s  [ s ee  Fehrenbacher & 
gl-. , 19671 which have a r e l a t i v e l y  low amount of water  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t he  
c rops  because of r e s t r i c t i o n  i n  deep r o o t  p e n e t r a t i o n  and poor permeabi l i ty  
of t h e  c l a y  s u b s o i l .  P r e c i p i t a t i o n  i n  t h e  a r e a ,  though s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  
normal corn (Zea mays L.) growth, i s  seldom adequate  f o r  maximum 
product ion.  Therefore ,  i r r i g a t i o n  withdrawals may be s u b s t a n t i a l  i f  t h e  
p re sen t  t r end  of i r r i g a t i o n  p r a c t i c e  cont inues .  It has been determined 
q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  t h a t  such withdrawals could be s i g n i f i c a n t  i f  t h e  p r i c e  of 
corn i nc reases  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  [ see  Eheart  and Libby, 1981 1 . 
A market s imu la t i on  was app l i ed  t o  a d a t a  s e t  t h a t  was p a r t l y  r e a l i s t i c  
and p a r t l y  hypothe t ic .  It was empi r i ca l l y  determined t h a t  approximately 
e i g h t  thousand a c r e s  (32.37 sq km) of cropland o v e r l i e  a shal low a q u i f e r  
which i s  h y d r a u l i c a l l y  connected t o  t he  r i v e r .  This  land was h y p o t h e t i c a l l y  
d iv ided  i n t o  twenty-five p l o t s  of 320 a c r e s  (1.29 sq km) each. Each water  
u s e r  o r  market p a r t i c i p a n t  was represen ted  by the  owner of one such p l o t  on 
which corn was assumed t o  be grown. These hypo the t i ca l  farm owners, whose 
o b j e c t i v e s  were t o  maximize p r o f i t s ,  were r equ i r ed  t o  submit water  demand 
schedules  t o  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  so  t h a t  i n i t i a l  assignment of water r i g h t s  t o  
each b idder  could be made. 
The procedure f o r  computing t h e  economic worth of water  t o  a u s e r  
( i . e . ,  t h e  e x t r a  prof it der ived  a f t e r  i r r i g a t i o n  was employed) used by 
Eheart  and Libby [I9811 was adopted i n  t h i s  s tudy.  The method was based on 
a m u l t i p l e  r e g r e s s i o n  model [ s ee  Leeper e t  a l . ,  19741 which r e l a t e s  corn 
y i e l d  i n  a ten-week growing season t o  t h e  amount of preseason water 
a v a i l a b l e  i n  t he  r o o t  zone, weekly t o t a l  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  and weekly mean 
maximum a i r  temperature .  Assuming weekly t o t a l  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  and weekly 
mean maximum a i r  temperature  were t he  same throughout t h e  twenty-five p l o t s ,  
any d i f f e r e n c e  i n  a v a i l a b l e  s o i l  mois tures  a t  p l a n t i n g  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  p l o t s  
would alone account f o r  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  among t h e  hypo the t i ca l  u s e r s  i n  
economic worth and water  demand curves.  (The a v a i l a b l e  mois tures  a t  
p l a n t i n g  were taken t o  be t he  same a s  t h e  s o i l  mois ture  c a p a c i t i e s ,  s i n c e  
t h e r e  i s  u s u a l l y  a s u r f e i t  of mois ture  i n  e a r l y  spr ing  i n  t h e  bas in . )  The 
a v a i l a b l e  s o i l  water c a p a c i t i e s  f o r  t h e  twenty-five p l o t s  were 
hypo the t i ca l l y  assumed t o  range from 2.00 t o  9.68 inches  (5.08 t o  24.59 cm) 
i n  increments of 0.32 inch  (0.81 cm) . This  r e p r e s e n t s  a  range of about +4 
inches (10.16 cm) around t h e  approximate average of 6  inches  (15.24 cm) i n  
t h i s  claypan a r e a  [ s ee  Libby, 19821. Throughout t h i s  r e p o r t ,  u s e r  1 r e f e r s  
t o  t h e  farmer whose a v a i l a b l e  s o i l  mois ture  capac i ty  i s  2 inches ,  u s e r  2,  
2.32 inches ,  and so  on. Because water  is more va luab le  t o  those  u s e r s  wi th  
l im i t ed  mois ture  c a p a c i t i e s  i n  t h e i r  p l o t s ,  t h e  economic worth of water t o  
u s e r  1, i n  gene ra l ,  i s  higher  than t o  u s e r  2, e t c .  
H i s t o r i c a l  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  and maximum ambient temperature  records  a t  
Char les ton ,  I l l i n o i s ,  and streamflow d a t a  a t  U.S. Geological  Survey Gaging 
S t a t i o n  03379500 below Clay C i t y  were co l l ec t ed .  F i f t y - fou r  years  of record  
from 1915 t o  1976, excluding years  1917, 1944, 1945, and 1949 through 1953, 
were found common t o  t h e  two s t a t i o n s .  The corn-yield model was app l i ed  t o  
each of t h e  25 hypo the t i ca l  p l o t s  f o r  a  ten-week per iod  each year [ s ee  
Eheart  and Libby, 19811, w i th  an assumed maximum water  a p p l i c a t i o n  r a t e  of 
two inches per  week on 280 a c r e s  per  p l o t ,  o r  3.36 c f s  (0.095 cms). 
Water was assumed t o  be taken e i t h e r  d i r e c t l y  from t h e  s t ream o r  from 
nearby a q u i f e r s  which a r e  h y d r a u l i c a l l y  connected t o  t h e  s t ream ( i . e . ,  
groundwater which can be rep len ished  by t h e  s t ream) ,  and no minimum 
streamflow requirement was imposed. Water withdrawn by t h e  u s e r s  was 
assumed t o  be of high q u a l i t y .  The corn p r i c e  was assumed t o  be $3.50 per  
bushe l ,  which is  s l i g h t l y  higher  than t h e  c u r r e n t  market va lue .  A t  t h i s  
p r i c e  l e v e l ,  i r r i g a t i o n  was found t o  be p r o f i t a b l e  f o r  a  6-inch (15.24 cm) 
o r  l e s s  preseason s o i l  mois ture   heart and Libby, 19811 because t h e  c o s t s  
of i r r i g a t i o n  equipment and i t s  ope ra t i on  a r e  exceeded by t h e  expected 
i nc rease  i n  r e t u r n  from crop product ion f o r  t he se  s o i l s .  

5- OVERVIEW OF ANALYTICAL PROCEDURE 
5.1 MARKETS SIMULATED 
A l e n t i c  base market f o r  water r i g h t s  a s  descr ibed  above was appl ied  t o  
t he  L i t t l e  Wabash Basin da ta .  It was assumed t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  governing 
agency performing a l l  admin i s t r a t i ve  func t ions .  This agency was assumed 
r e spons ib l e  f o r  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of t h e  market s t r u c t u r e ,  t h e  b a s i s  of 
d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  permi ts ,  and t h e  i n i t i a l  assignment of water  r i g h t s  t o  
p o t e n t i a l  u s e r s  according t o  some app rop r i a t e  predef ined  mechanism. It was 
assumed t h a t  r i g h t s  of r e l a t i v e l y  long d u r a t i o n  a r e  s o l d  (o r  g iven  away) i n  
t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e  ( t h e  base  r i g h t s  market)  i n  order  t o  a l low medium- t o  
long-range planning,  and i n  t h e  subsequent spo t  market s t a g e ,  r i g h t s  of 
r e l a t i v e l y  s h o r t  d u r a t i o n  a r e  exchanged among t h e  u s e r s  j u s t  p r i o r  t o  use.  
Because, a s  expla ined  below, it was p o s s i b l e  t o  address  t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  of 
t h e  markets without  s imula t ing  t h e  spot  markets ,  and because of t h e  
complexity of t h e  spo t  markets ,  s imula t ion  i n  t h i s  s tudy  was r e s t r i c t e d  t o  
t h e  base r i g h t s  markets.  
Both t h e  f r a c t i o n a l  flow r i g h t  (FFR) and t h e  p r i o r i t i z e d  s teady  use  
r i g h t  (PSUR) systems (def ined  e a r l i e r )  were s imulated f o r  a  l e n t i c  s t r u c t u r e  
only.  The FFR's a r e  homogeneous goods which de f ine  water  r i g h t s  i n  
f r a c t i o n s  of flow, whereas t he  PSUR's a r e  heterogeneous goods c o n s i s t i n g  of 
two parameters ,  namely, t h e  s i z e  of r i g h t  i n  terms of f low r a t e s  and t h e  
j u n i o r i t y  of r i g h t  def ined  a s  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  streamflow above which a  r i g h t  
may be exerc i sed .  For each system, two d i f f e r e n t  i n i t i a l  a l l o c a t i o n  
procedures were examined. The four  schemes a r e  summarized a s  fol lows:  
1. FFR system: 
a .  Permits  were s o l d  by s i n g l e  p r i c e  auc t ion .  
b. FFR's of fou r  percent  each were g iven  t o  each of t h e  
twenty-five b idders  w i th  subsequent r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  among 
u s e r s  by s i n g l e  p r i c e  auc t ion .  
2. PSUR system: 
a .  Permits  which were a l l  of t he  same s i z e  ( s e t  by t h e  
a u t h o r i t y )  were so ld  by second p r i c e  auc t ion .  
b.  Permits  of t he  same s i z e  were given away according t o  a  
modif ied Knaster's f a i r  d i v i s i o n  procedure ( s e e  Appendix 
B). 
5.2 BASIS OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY COMPARISON 
Market s imula t ions  were performed t o  a s s e s s  a  number of economic 
c r i t e r i a  of t h e  permit system. Both ex  a n t e  and ex pos t  ana lyses  were made. 
Ex a n t e  a l l o c a t i o n  i s  based on t h e  assumption t h a t  outcomes of f u t u r e  events  
-- 
which a f f e c t  t h e  economic worth of water t o  each user-  (and, hence, a f f e c t  
t h e  aggrega te  economic worth)- occur i n  a  random manner. I n  t h i s  s tudy ,  
each year of h i s t o r i c a l  record  of p r e c i p i t a t i o n ,  temperature ,  and streamflow 
was assumed t o  have equal  p r o b a b i l i t y  of occurrence a t  any time i n  t h e  
f u t u r e .  I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t he  ex a n t e  a l l o c a t i o n  which d e a l s  wi th  expec t a t i on  
of even t s ,  t h e  exm a l l o c a t i o n  i s  based e i t h e r  on h inds igh t ,  o r  on t h e  
assumption t h a t  f u t u r e  events  a r e  known wi th  c e r t a i n t y .  
The a n a l y t i c a l  procedure may be ou t l i ned  a s  fol lows:  
1 The ex a n t e  (expected)  economic worths of permi ts  under t h e  FFR 
and PSUR systems (which, f o r  each, was assumed t o  be t h e  same 
under e i t h e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  system) were determined. 
2  The ex  a n t e  d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  a s p e c t s  were assessed  by c a l c u l a t i n g  
t h e  ex  a n t e  i nd iv idua l  f i n a n c i a l  worths f o r  each of t h e  four  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  systems. (The ex a n t e  f i n a n c i a l  worth ( g a i n )  of 
water  t o  a  bidder  i s  h i s  expected economic worth l e s s  t h e  payment 
( e i t h e r ' t o  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o r  t o  o t h e r  b idde r s )  f o r  h i s  r i g h t ;  t h a t  
i s ,  h i s  consumer's su rp lus .  ) 
3 The fol lowing twelve eva lua t ions  of ex Dost economic worths were 
made. For both t h e  FFR and PSUR systems and f o r  t h r e e  10-year 
sequences from the  h i s t o r i c a l  record  r ep re sen t ing  wet,  d ry ,  and 
h ighly  v a r i a b l e  per iods ,  two bidding scena r io s  were s imulated.  
Under t h e  f i r s t  s cena r io ,  no f o r e s i g h t  was assumed (except  f o r  t h e  
expec t a t i on  of average outcomes) and t h e  ex  pos t  worth was taken 
t o  be t he  a c t u a l  (ex p o s t )  worth of t h e  assignment of r i g h t s  f o r  
t h e  ex a n t e  s imula t ion .  Under t h e  o t h e r  s cena r io ,  p e r f e c t  
f o r e s i g h t  was assumed; each use r  b id  according t o  h i s  p r e sen t  
worth f o r  t he  10-year sequence. 
4 The aggrega te  and ind iv idua l  economic worths of non-market 
p o l i c i e s  were s imulated t o  provide benchmarks f o r  comparisons of 
t h e  market schemes. Two of t he se  p o l i c i e s  were taken a s  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of a l t e r n a t i v e  "regulatory" p o l i c i e s ,  and r ep re sen t  
lower bounds on the  e f f i c i e n c y  of t h e  a l l o c a t i o n .  The o t h e r  two 
p o l i c i e s  r ep re sen t  upper bounds on a 1  l o c a t i o n  e f f i c i e n c y  . Under 
t h e  f i r s t  of t he  r egu la to ry  programs, FFR's of four  percent  each 
were given t o  each of t h e  twenty-five u s e r s ,  and r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  of 
t he se  permits  among use r s  was p roh ib i t ed .  I n  t h e  o the r  scheme, 
he re  c a l l e d  t h e  "King Solomon'' po l i cy ,  a l l  u s e r s  were allowed t o  
withdraw whatever amount of water they d e s i r e d  (maximum of 0.095 
cms per  p l o t )  i f  streamf low s u f f i c i e n t  t o  supply a l l  was 
a v a i l a b l e ;  o therwise ,  none was permit ted t o  d i v e r t  any water  from 
t h e  s t ream a t  a l l .  To provide a  high benchmark f o r  t h e  economic 
e f f i c i e n c y  of t h e  base  r i g h t s  markets ,  bo th  t h e  ex a n t e  and ex 
post opt imal  a l l o c a t i o n s  were determined. The ex a n t e  optimum is  
def ined  a s  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of base r i g h t s  which maximizes t h e  
expected aggregate economic worth of the rights while the ex 
optimum i s  the allocation of base rights which maximizes the 
(known) present value of aggregate economic worth. 
6- DETAILS OF THE SIMULATION PROCESS 
The market s imula t ion  procedure e n t a i l e d  s imula t ing  t h e  processes  of 1 )  
bidding f o r  water r i g h t s  (by t h e  u s e r s )  and 2 )  a l l o c a t i n g  t h e  water r i g h t s  
on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  b i d s  (by t h e  a u t h o r i t y ) .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  a s  noted above, 
t h e  aggrega te  and ind iv idua l  economic worths of both e f f i c i e n t  and 
i n e f f i c i e n t  non-market p o l i c i e s  were determined. These t h r e e  processes  a r e  
descr ibed  i n  order  a s  fo l lows .  
6.1 SIMULATION OF ECONOMIC WORTH OF RIGHTS AND B I D  CURVES 
I n  each of t h e  markets a s  envis ioned,  each b idder  is r equ i r ed  t o  submit 
a  b id  schedule ,  e i t h e r  i n  t h e  form of a  t a b l e  o r  a s  a  graph, which g ives  t h e  
p r i c e  he i s  w i l l i n g  t o  pay f o r  va r ious  s i z e s  (and j u n i o r i t i e s ,  f o r  PSUR's) 
of r i g h t s .  For purposes of t h e  s imula t ion ,  s t r a t e g i c  bidding o r  c o a l i t i o n s  
on t h e  p a r t  of b idders  were assumed no t  t o  occur .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  b idders  were 
assumed t o  be r i sk -neu t r a l .  The b id  schedules ,  then ,  were assumed t o  be 
honest s ta tements  of t h e  expected va lue  o r  p r e sen t  va lue  of a  water  r i g h t  of 
a  c e r t a i n  s i z e  (and j u n i o r i t y ) .  I n  o rde r  t o  maintain cons is tency  wi th  t h e  
chronologica l  o rder  of events  i n  an a c t u a l  market,  we d e s c r i b e  t h e  bidding 
s imula t ion  be fo re  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  s imula t ion .  The economic worth of water  t o  
each use r  under each po l i cy  (bo th  market and non-market) was ca l cu l a t ed  
using an app rop r i a t e  formula. The d e r i v a t i o n  of t he se  formulas i s  
undertaken i n  t h e  fol lowing paragraphs.  However, t h e  r eade r  who i s  not  
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  d e t a i l s  of t h e  bidding s imu la t i on  may f i n d  i t  more 
convenient  t o  s k i p  over t h e  equa t ions  and proceed d i r e c t l y  t o  subsec t ion  2. 
The app rop r i a t e  use of t h e  equa t ions  f o r  each po l i cy  is  ind i ca t ed  i n  Table  
1. 
Let  t h e  maximum q u a n t i t y  of water  t h a t  would be u s e f u l  f o r  i r r i g a t i o n  
i n  week j i n  year  k  be given by R (which i s  taken a s  0.095 crns l e s s  
r a i n f a l l ) .  Le t  t h e  a s soc i a t ed  e c d t i c  worth of R t o  b idder  i be g iven  by j k 
W i a k  (which i s  p ropor t i ona l  t o  R ) Wi -k  were computed f o r  each of t h e  
twdnty-f i v e  b idders  ( 1 , . . . , 25 o r  eves!y week of t h e  lo-week per iod  
( j = l , .  . . 910) f o r  each of t h e  54 years  (k= l , .  . . ,541 [ s e e  Libby, 19821. Let 
Q. be t h e  t o t a l  a v a i l a b l e  streamflow i n  week j i n  year  k ,  FF be an assumed 
s l?e  of t h e  FFR a s  a  f r a c t i o n  of streamflow, J and S be t h e  assumed 
j u n i o r i t y  and s i z e  of r i g h t  i n  crns, r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  under t h e  PSUR system (S 
i s  always l e s s  than o r  equal t o  0.095 cms). Fu r the r ,  l e t  C be t h e  annual 
c a p i t a l  c o s t ,  nyr  be the  number of years  i n  t h e  per iod considered,  nwk be 
t h e  number of weeks per year  ( f o r  a l l  c a se s  i n  t h i s  s tudy ,  nwk=lO), and I be 
t h e  annual  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  expressed i n  f r a c t i o n s .  The annual economic worth 
of t he  water  r i g h t  t o  bidder  i i s  then given by 
nY r nwk 
where t he  Parameters f and g under d i f f e r e n t  cond i t i ons  a r e  def ined a s  
fo l lows:  k  jk  
TABLE 1. Summary of Programs Simulated 
Sec t ion  Assumed Bidder Economic Equations Equations 
6 Def in i t i on  D i s t r i b u t i o n  Knowledge of Evaluat ion Used t o  Used f o r  
Reference Bas i s  Bas i s  F u t u r e E v e n t s  Basis  Simulate Economic 
Bidding Evaluat ion 
2.1.1 FFR Sold by Single  
P r i c e  Auction 
Di s t r ibu ted  Freely-  
Redis t r ibu ted  by 
Single  P r i c e  Auction 
Sold by Second- 
P r i ce  Auction 
Di s t r ibu ted  by Game 
of F a i r  Div is ion  
Sold o r  Re- 
d i s t r i b u t e d  by 
Single  P r i c e  Auction 
Sold by Second- 
P r i ce  Auction o r  
D i s t r ibu ted  by Game 
of F a i r  Div is ion  
Sold o r  Re- 
d i s t r i b u t e d  by 
Single  P r i c e  Auction 
Sold by Second- 
P r i c e  Auction o r  
D i s t r ibu ted  by Game 
of F a i r  Div is ion  
Optimal (Ex Ante) 
Optimal (Ex Pos t )  
King Solomon 
4% Each (No Trade) 










2.2.2 P SUR 
Pe r fec t  Ex Post  FFR 
PSUR Pe r fec t  Ex Post  
* None Ex Post  FFR 







Ex Post  
Ex Ante 
Ex Ante 
Ex Post  
* 
+ However, a p e r f e c t  knowledge of the  p r o b a b i l i t y  s f  f u t u r e  events  was assumed. Denotes "not appl icable ."  
f o r  t h e  no-foresight  
assumption (ex a n t e  a n a l y s i s ;  
Ei i s  t h e  expected o r  ex a n t e  (2 )  
opt imal  economic worth)  
f o r  t he  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  
assumption (ex vos t  a n a l y s i s ;  
Ei is  t h e  a c t u a l  o r  ex ~ o s t  
f k  = 1/{[1- (1+1)-~y~]  ( 1 + 1 ) ~ )  opt imal  economic worth- f k  i s  (3 )  
equa l  t o  t h e  c a p i t a l  recovery 
f a c t o r  f o r  nyr yea r s  t imes t h e  
single-payment p re sen t  worth 
f a c t o r  eva lua ted  a t  t h e  kth y e a r )  
For t h e  FFR system, 
jk = Q j k o ~ ~ / ~ j k  
gjk = 1 
f o r  a l l  t r i a l  va lues  of FF. 
For t he  PSUR system, 
g jk  = 0 i f  (qjk-J) S 0 
gjk = m i n ( ~ j ~ - ~ , S ) / R j ~  i f  0 < ( q j k - ~ )  I R j k  
jk  = min(1 ,s /Rjk)  i f  (Qp-J) R jk, 
f o r  a l l  t r i a l  va lues  of S and J. 
Using these  equa t ions ,  E- was determined f o r  given s i z e  (and j u n i o r i t y )  of 
1 
r i g h t .  
For t h e  opt imal  a l l o c a t i o n ,  gijk r ep l aces  g  i n  Equation 1 and is 
g iven  a s  fol lows:  j k 
where Lijk, t h e  amount of water l e f t o v e r  i n  week j i n  year  k  f o r  u se r  i is  
given by 
where b i s  t h e  rank (from 1 t o  25) of Wi.k i n  descending o rde r  of magnitude, 
and (b-11.8 is  t h e  amount of water a l l o c a t e d  t o  u se r s  who p lace  a  h igher  
va lue  on watJ!! than  use r  i. Equation 2 f o r  f k  i s  used f o r  determining an 
a n t e  optimum and Equation 3 i s  used f o r  t h e  ex  post  optimum. 
For the  King Solomon p o l i c y ,  
For t he  4%-each non-market po l i cy ,  g i s  t h e  same a s  Equation 4 with FF s e t  
a t  0.04; t h a t  i s ,  j k 
I n  s imulat ing t h e  PSUR system a s impl i fy ing  assumption was made t h a t  
water  r i g h t s  gran ted  t o  t h e  b idders  were i n  blocks of 0.095 crns- t h e  maximum 
r a t e  of water  t h a t  could ever  be appl ied .  The a l l o c a t i o n  r e s u l t i n g  from 
t h i s  r e s t r i c t i o n  was l e s s  than t h e  maximum i n  aggregate  economic worth f o r  
t h i s  type of r i g h t ,  s i nce  g r e a t e r  e f f i c i e n c y  could be achieved by breaking 
down water r i g h t s  i n t o  d i f f e r e n t  smaller  blocks. However, t h i s  modi f ica t ion  
reduces t h e  computational burden of t he  market system s imula t ion  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  and provides a lower bound on t h e  economic e f f i c i e n c y .  ( I n  
p r a c t i c e ,  i t  would be expected t h a t  most of t h e  l o s t  economic e f f i c i e n c y  
could be recovered i n  a smoothly func t ioning  spot  market.) It was assumed 
t h a t  s ta tements  of t he  economic worths of 0.095 crns a t  each j u n i o r i t y  l eve l  
( i n  increments of 0.095 cms) were submitted a s  b ids  by each market 
p a r t i c i p a n t ;  t h a t  i s ,  b ids  were submitted f o r  S=0.095 crns and J=(r -1) -S  
( r=1 ,2 ,3  ,..., 25) i n  Equation 5 [ see  Libby, 19821. 
The market s imula t ion  assumes t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no e x i s t i n g  i r r i g a t i o n  
equipment; t hus ,  t h e  demand curves f o r  water f o r  each farmer have an i n i t i a l  
d i s c o n t i n u i t y .  F igure  6-1 shows a t y p i c a l  p l o t  of Ei ve r sus  FFR s i z e  (FF). 
The i n i t i a l  p r i c e  of water of t h e  demand func t ion  (up t o  Fo) i s  t h e  s lope of 
t h e  l i n e  which i s  tangent  t o  t h e  worth curve and passes  through t h e  o r i g i n ,  
and from Fo t o  an FFR of 1 i s  t h e  s lope  of t h e  worth curve ( i . e . ,  t h e  
marginal worth) .  The demand curve f o r  most water u s e r s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  
composed of a ho r i zon ta l  segment and a monotonic decreasing segment. By 
t h i s  method, a s e t  of i nd iv idua l  demand curves g iv ing  t h e  p r i c e  a s  a 
func t ion  of t h e  s i z e  of t he  r i g h t  i n  f r a c t i o n  of flow was obtained.  
Flow c h a r t s  showing t h e  computational procedure f o r  t h e  b i d  curves f o r  
t h e  PSUR and FFR systems a r e  shown i n  Appendix C. 
6.2 MARKET SIMULATION PROCEDURES 
The market procedures a l l o c a t e  water permits a s  they a r e  def ined ,  
according t o  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  methods descr ibed i n  Sec t ion  5. The 
s imula t ions  of t h e  markets a s  wel l  a s  t h e  eva lua t ions  of t h e  r e s u l t i n g  
ind iv idua l  and aggregate  worths a r e  descr ibed a s  fol lows.  These procedures 
a r e  sunrmarized i n  Table 1. 
6.2.1 FFR System (NO Fores igh t ,  Ex Ante Basis  of Ana lys i s )  
6.2.1.1 FFR so ld  by s i n g l e  p r i c e  auc t ion  
The s i n g l e  p r i c e  auc t ion  mechanism has been suggested as  a  means of 
d i s t r i b u t i n g  r e sou rces  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  it might be manipulated i n  some 
cases  [ s ee  Lyon, 19821, s i n c e  it may tend t o  produce e f f i c i e n t  outcomes a s  
the  number of b idders  of s i m i l a r  s i z e  i nc reases .  Under t h i s  scheme, each 
market p a r t i c i p a n t  i s  r equ i r ed  t o  submit h i s  e n t i r e  demand curve a s  a  s e t  of 
b i d s .  The auc t ionee r  then  determines a  p r i c e  which w i l l  c l e a r  t h e  market 
from t h e  aggrega te  demand curve which i s  obtained by summing t h e  i nd iv idua l  
demands a t  each p r i c e  l e v e l  ( i . e . ,  by summing h o r i z o n t a l l y ) .  The assumption 
t h a t  no s t r a t e g i c  bidding t akes  p lace  makes it p o s s i b l e  t o  use  t h e  demand 
curves c a l c u l a t e d  above a s  b id  schedules .  For t h e  FFR market,  t h e  
market-clear ing p r i c e  (MCP) pe r  percent  of flow per  year  i s  t h e  p r i c e  a t  
which t h e  t o t a l  demand f o r  water equa l s  100% of supply.  The s i z e  of t h e  FFR 
ass igned  t o  b idder  i ( i = 1 ,  ..., 251, FFi, could then  be determined from 
ind iv idua l  demand curves a t  t h e  market-clear ing p r i c e .  The payment by each 
succes s fu l  b idde r  is MCP times FF . The expected economic worth of water  t o  
u s e r  i is determined by Equation i using t h e  ex  a n t e  formula (Equation 2 )  
f o r  f k  and t h e  FFR formula (Equation 4 )  f o r  g  . The user 's  f i n a n c i a l  worth 
( n e t  g a i n ) ,  FWi, is  t h e  economic worth l e s s  ti: payment; t h a t  i s ,  
The s i n g l e  p r i c e  auc t ion  mechanism may be used on ly  f o r  homogeneous goods 
such a s  FFR's, n o t  f o r  PSUR's which a r e  heterogeneous. 
6.2.1.2 Free  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of FFR's wi th  subsequent r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  
Under t h i s  po l i cy ,  FFR's of 4% each a r e  g iven  t o  each u s e r  and a r e  
subsequent ly  r e d i s t r i b u t e d  among them by s i n g l e  p r i c e  auc t ion .  The 
i n d i v i d u a l  and aggrega te  economic worths a s  we l l  a s  t h e  FFR f o r  each b idder  
a r e  assumed t o  be t h e  same, a f t e r  t r a d i n g ,  a s  those  of t h e  FFR s i n g l e  p r i c e  
a u c t i o n  system, bu t  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of f i n a n c i a l  worths i s  d i f f e r e n t .  
Mathematical ly ,  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  worth f o r  b idder  i is g iven  by 
where MCP and FF. a r e  a s  def ined  above. The f i n a n c i a l  worth of water  t o  
each u s e r  is  h igae r  than  t h a t  under t h e  s i n g l e  p r i c e  a u c t i o n  po l i cy  by an 
amount equa l  t o  O.O~(MCP), h i s  i n i t i a l  endowment. 
6.2.2 PSUR System (No Fores igh t ,  Ex Ante Basis  of Ana lys i s )  
PSUR's a r e  heterogeneous goods which a r e  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  from FFR's. 
An a l l o c a t i o n  mechanism which ach ieves  opt imal  economic e f f i c i e n c y  i s  
d iscussed  i n  Sec t ion  3,  but  i s  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y  cumbersome. The s e q u e n t i a l  
auc t ion  mechanism suggested e a r l i e r  was employed i n  t h i s  s tudy.  Two 
ve r s ions  of t h i s  a l l o c a t i o n  procedure,  namely, t h e  second p r i c e  auc t ion  and 
a  modified Knaster's f a i r  d i v i s i o n  procedure were examined. For e i t h e r  
market system, t h e  u se r  who has t h e  h ighes t  economic worth ( b i d )  f o r  t h e  
lowest j u n i o r i t y  r i g h t  r ece ives  t h a t  r i g h t .  (The b i d s  were determined by 
applying Equation 1, using t h e  ex  a n t e  formula (Equation 2 )  f o r  f k  and t h e  
PSUR formula  quati ti on 5 )  f o r  g A k  f o r  a  f i x e d  va lue  of S of 0.095 cms.) The 
use r  wi th  t he  h ighes t  b i d  f o r  t i e  nex t  higher  j u n i o r i t y  and who has not  y e t  
won any r i g h t s  r ece ives  t h a t  r i g h t ,  and so  on. No b idder  i s  allowed t o  
r e c e i v e  more than  one r i g h t .  The expected aggregate  economic worth of t h i s  
program is t h e  sum of i nd iv idua l  economic worths f o r  a l l  succes s fu l  b idders .  
6.2.2.1 PSUR so ld  by second p r i c e  auc t ion  
I n  t h e  PSUR second p r i c e  auc t ion  system, t h e  amount of money a  winning 
b idder  i s  r equ i r ed  t o  pay was determined by t h e  next  h ighes t  b id  f o r  t h e  
r i g h t  of t he  same j u n i o r i t y .  The f i n a n c i a l  worth of water  t o  a  succes s fu l  
b idder  was h i s  expected economic worth m'nus t he  payment requi red .  Let EWir 
be t he  expected economic worth a t  t h e  rtk j u n i o r i t y  ( l s t = O  crns, 2nd=0.095 
crns, and s o  on)  f o r  b idder  i. H i s  f i n a n c i a l  worth i s  
6.2.2.2 PSUR d i s t r i b u t e d  by a  f a i r  d i v i s i o n  procedure 
A modified v e r s i o n  of Knaster's game of f a i r  d i v i s i o n  was s imulated i n  
t h i s  a l l o c a t i o n  procedure.  Knaster's mechanism i s  a  procedure f o r  t h e  f r e e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of shared heterogeneous goods (e.g. ,  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of an 
e s t a t e )  which i s  considered by Luce and R a i f f a  [I9571 and Samuelson [19801. 
Qua l i f i ed  r e c i p i e n t s  b id  f o r  r i g h t s  i n i t i a l l y  and side-payments (which sum 
t o  ze ro )  a r e  made from succes s fu l  b idders  t o  o t h e r s ,  based on t h e  b i d s  
tendered by each. A d i s cus s ion  and mathematical formula t ion  of t h i s  method 
can be found i n  Appendix B. Like t h e  PSUR second p r i c e  auc t ion ,  each use r  
r e c e i v e s  a t  most one r i g h t  and t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  procedure a l l o c a t e s  r i g h t s  
with t he  lowest j u n i o r i t y  f i r s t  and then  t h e  r i g h t  wi th  t h e  next  higher  
j u n i o r i t y ,  and so on. D i s t r i b u t i o n s  of r i g h t s  and economic worths a r e  t h e  
same a s  t hose  f o r  t h e  second p r i c e  auc t ion ,  bu t  t h e  payments t o  o t h e r  
b idders  a r e  d i f f e r e n t .  There is no e x t e r n a l  payment t o  t h e  governing 
agency. The f i n a n c i a l  worth t o  b idder  i i s  
where n i s  t h e  number of b idders  who p l ace  p o s i t i v e  b i d s  on t h e  r t h jun ior iEy  r i g h t ,  and m is  t h e  h ighes t  number of j u n i o r i t y  such t h a t  EW i s  
p o s i t i v e .  The term EWir/nr i s  t he  f a i r  sha re  of t he  r th j u n i o r i t y  rigfit f o r  
b idder  i and t h e  1 s t  two terms i n s i d e  t h e  b racke t s  i s  t h e  su rp lus  o r  
d e f i c i t  f o r  t he  rt' j u n i o r i t y  r i g h t .  
6.2.3 Markets with P e r f e c t  F o r e s i g h t .  
Markets wi th  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  were s imulated f o r  t h e  PSUR and FFR 
systems i n  a  s i m i l a r  manner by us ing  t h e  ex p o s t  formula (Equation 3 )  f o r  f k  
i n s t e a d  of t h e  ex a n t e  formula  quati ti on IT. Unlike t he  ex a n t e  formula 
which only  accounts  f o r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of occurrence of c l i m a t i c  events ,  
t he  ex  pos t  formula takes  account of t he  order  of even t s  i n  a  sequence, by 
t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of an app rop r i a t e  d i s coun t  f a c t o r .  
6.2.4 Ex Post  Resu l t s  of Ex Ante Market A l loca t ion  
By assuming each b idder  holds t he  s i z e  (and j u n i o r i t y )  of r i g h t  
a l l o c a t e d  t o  him based on expected economic worth a s  descr ibed  above, h i s  ex 
post economic worth f o r  a  given known sequence of weather and streamflow 
d a t a  can be determined by applying Equation 1, using t h e  ex pos t  formula 
(Equat ion 3 )  f o r  f k  and t h e  (now known) va lues  of FF o r  J. 
6.3 EVALUATION OF NON-MAEtKET PROGRAMS 
Nonlnarket programs do not  a l l o c a t e  water  according t o  b i d s ,  Aggregate 
and i n d i v i d u a l  worths were eva lua ted  f o r  comparison using t h e  same economic 
d a t a .  The procedures f o r  t he se  eva lua t ions  a r e  descr ibed  below. 
6.3.1 Ex Ante Optimal ( ~ f f i c i e n t )  A l loca t ion  
An ex a n t e  opt imal  a l l o c a t i o n  i s  t h e  r e s u l t  of so lv ing  t h e  op t imiza t ion  
problem of maximizing aggrega te  expected economic worth s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  
c o n s t r a i n t  t h a t  t he  t o t a l  water  withdrawn is  l e s s  than  o r  equal  t o  t h e  
a v a i l a b l e  flow. Due t o  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  d a t a  s e t ,  a  c l o s e  approximation 
t o  t h e  opt imal  a l l o c a t i o n  may be ob ta ined  by t h e  fol lowing procedure.  I n  
any g iven  week, R u n i t s  of flow a r e  a l l o c a t e d  f i r s t  t o  u s e r  1, and then  t o  j k  u se r  2,  and so  on, u n t i l  a l l  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  water  i n  t h e  s t ream is  exhausted. 
(For most of t h e  540-week s e r i e s ,  u se r  1 has a  higher  u n i t  r e t u r n  ( W i . k / ~ .  ) 
than  u s e r  2 ,  e t c . )  The ex a n t e  opt imal  worth i s  t h e  expected va lue  02 a l l k  
such a l l o c a t i o n s ,  and was obtained from Equation 1 using t h e  ex a n t e  formula 
 quati ti on 2 )  f o r  f k  and t h e  opt imal  a l l o c a t i o n  formula (Equation 6 )  f o r  g  
by s e t t i n g  b equa l  i. For t h i s  d a t a  base,  t h e  assignments r e s u l t i n g  from j k 
t h i s  h e u r i s t i c  approach can be shown t o  y i e l d  aggrega te  and ind iv idua l  
economic worths w i t h i n  0.1% of t h e  t r u e  optimum. 
6.3.2 Ex Post  Optimal A l loca t ion  
Ex p o s t  opt imal  a l l o c a t i o n  i s  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  which r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  b e s t  
- 
ex  pos t  aggregate  economic worth ( i . e . ,  under condi t ions  of p e r f e c t  
-
f o r e s i g h t ) .  The a l l o c a t i o n  is  l i k e  t h a t  of t h e  ex a n t e  opt imal  a l l o c a t i o n  
except t h a t  t h e  economic worth i s  brought back t o  t h e  p re sen t  worth by 
applying an appropr i a t e  d iscount  f a c t o r .  Equivalent annual ex post  economic 
worth of water  t o  each use r  was obtained from Equation 1 using t h e  ex post  
formula  quati ti on 3)  f o r  f k  and t h e  opt imal  a l l o c a t i o n  formula ( ~ ~ u a t i a n  6 )  
f o r  gjk.  
6.3.3 King Solomon Pol icy  
A s  i nd i ca t ed  above, t h e  maximum u s e f u l  amount of i r r i g a t i o n  water  i s  
t h e  same f o r  each bidder .  The expected economic worth of a  u se r  under t h e  
King Solomon po l i cy  is  computed by averaging the  sum of a l l  t h e  economic 
worths f o r  t he  weeks wi th  streamflow not  l e s s  than those  des i r ed  by a l l  t h e  
u s e r s .  st hat i s ,  it i s  computed from Equation 1 using t h e  ex an te  formula 
 quati ti on 2)  f o r  f k  and t h e  King Solomon formula  q qua ti on 7 )  f o r  gjk.)  No 
ex post eva lua t ion  of t h i s  po l i cy  was made. 
-
6.3.4 FFR's of 4% Each without Trading (Non-market Po l i cy )  
I n  t h i s  non-market po l i cy ,  t h e  expected annual economic worth of a  u se r  
i s  obtained from Equation 1 using t h e  -- ex a n t e  formula  quati ti on 2 )  f o r  f k  
and t h e  non-market formula  quati ti on 8 )  f o r  g  . The Ex p o s t  economic worth 
of t h e  ex a n t e  a l l o c a t i o n  was a l s o  calculatedJ!or t h i s  po l i cy  i n  order  t o  
provide a  low benchmark on t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  of t h e  market systems, and i s  a l s o  
determined from Equation 8 using t h e  ex post  formula  quati ti on 3 )  f o r  fk .  

7- RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
7.1.1 Economic Eff ic iency  
A bar  graph showing t h e  expected annual aggregate  economic worth, 
e x t e r n a l  monetary payment (payment t o  t he  a u t h o r i t y )  and f i n a n c i a l  worth 
(def ined  a s  t he  d i f f e r e n c e )  f o r  each pol icy  is  presented i n  F igure  7-1. It 
should be noted t h a t ,  under t he  assumptions made above, t h e  aggregate  
economic worth of t he  two d i f f e r e n t  i n i t i a l  assignment schemeo a r e  t h e  same 
f o r  e i t h e r  b a s i s  of d e f i n i t i o n  (FFR's o r  PSUR's), bu t  would, i n  gene ra l ,  be 
d i f f e r e n t  f o r  one b a s i s  a5 opposed t o  another .  However, t h e  r e s u l t s  show 
t h a t  t he  aggregate  economic worths f o r  t he  PSUR and FFR p o l i c i e s  a r e  almost 
i d e n t i c a l -  about 94.5% of t he  ex an te  optimum. The reason ,  i f  any, f o r  t h i s  
s i m i l a r i t y  i s  not  c l e a r ;  we c u r r e n t l y  be l i eve  it t o  be a coincidence. 
(Presumably, r i g h t s  w i th  d i f f e r e n t  s i z e s  and/or a more e f f i c i e n t  a l l o c a t i o n  
of PSUR's would capture  a higher  percentage of t h e  worth.) The two 
non-market schemes capture  a l e s s e r  percentage of t h e  ex  a n t e  optimal 
economic worth- 84% and 53% f o r  t h e  4%-each and the  King Solomon p o l i c i e s ,  
r e spec t ive ly .  
The maximum economic worth t h a t  could be recaptured  i n  t he  spot  market 
i o  t h e r e f o r e  about 5.5% of t h e  ex a n t e  optimum. The base market e f f i c i e n c y  
appears  smal le r  i f  t h e  aggregate  economic worth of t h e  4%-each non-market 
scheme i s  taken a s  t h e  base. Against such a base, t h e  FFR and PSUR systems 
capture  only about 65% of t he  a d d i t i o n a l  ex a n t e  opt imal  aggregate  economic 
worth, leaving approximately 35% more t o  be captured by the  spot  market. 
7.1.2 D i s t r i b u t i o n a l  Considerat ions 
Equity i s sues  of t h e  programs a r e  examined below by comparing the  
d i s t r i b u t i o n s  of f i n a n c i a l  worths,  bo th  among use r s ,  and between the  use r s  
a s  a group and t h e  r e s t  of soc i e ty .  Addi t iona l ly ,  a s  discussed i n  Sec t ion  
3.2 and Appendix A, c e r t a i n  a l l o c a t i o n  procedures were g e n e r a l l y  be regarded 
a s  having more d e s i r a b l e  equ i ty  p r o p e r t i e s  than o t h e r s ,  a p a r t  from t h e  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  p rope r t i e s .  General ly  speaking, PSUR 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  procedures shown g r e a t e r  weakness i n  t h i s  regard  than FFR 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  procedures.  
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value ,  and t h e  va lue  of t h e  (ex p o s t )  optimum, which would be based on t h e  
a c t u a l  sequence of even t s ,  may be  higher  o r  lower than  t h e  opt imal  expected 
(ex a n t e )  va lue .  The percentage of t h e  opt imal  economic worth which is 
cap tured  by t h e  base r i g h t s  market may a l s o  be higher  o r  lower than  t h a t  
determined by an ex a n t e  ana lys i s .  
There a r e  two e f f e c t s  which may r e s u l t  i n  an observed d i f f e r e n c e  
between t h e  economic worth of t h e  base r i g h t s  and t h e  opt imal  va lue  of water 
ass ignments .  The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  t h e  base  r i g h t s  system may no t  always 
a l l o c a t e  water  i n  t h e  o rde r  of h ighes t  economic use.  The second e f f e c t  i s  
t h a t  f u t u r e  events  cannot be p red i c t ed  p e r f e c t l y ,  and t h a t ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of 
t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  base  r i g h t  system, t h i s  l ack  of p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  w i l l  
r e s u l t  i n  a  depa r tu re  of t h e  economic worth of t h e  market s o l u t i o n  from t h a t  
of t h e  optimum. 
I n  o rde r  t o  a s s e s s  which of t h e  two e f f e c t s  was dominant f o r  t h e  L i t t l e  
Wabash d a t a ,  t h e  ex  ~ o s t  optimum was compared t o  two market s imula t ions ,  one 
based on no f o r e s i g h t  and t h e  o t h e r  based on p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t .  The p e r f e c t  
f o r e s i g h t  markets assumed f u t u r e  events  happen i n  a  c e r t a i n  way, and t h e i r  
ex  p o s t  va lues  were computed from Equation 1 us ing  t h e  e x  pos t  formula 
-
(Equation 3 )  f o r  fk .  The no-foresight  markets were represen ted  by t h e  ex 
a n t e  markets d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t he se  r i g h t s ,  f o r  which ex post va lues  were 
c a l c u l a t e d  ( s e e  Sec t ion  6.2.4). 
Since t h e  economic worth and t h e  va lue  of t he  p re sen t  worth f a c t o r  f o r  
each year  a r e  d i f f e r e n t ,  t h e  annual expost economic worth i s  a  func t ion  of 
t h e  d i scount  r a t e  and t h e  chronologica l  o rder  of t h e  streamflow, temperature  
and r a i n f a l l  sequences. A d i scount  r a t e  of 10% per  year  (I=0.10) and t h r e e  
10-year per iods  w i th  d i f f e r e n t  s t a r t i n g  yea r s  were chosen. Of a l l  10-year 
sequences i n  t h e  54-year pe r iod ,  t h e  10-year per iod s t a r t i n g  i n  year  1931 
r e p r e s e n t s  a  r e l a t i v e l y  d ry  per iod,  and t h e  t e n  years  s t a r t i n g  i n  1942 
r e p r e s e n t s  a  wet per iod .  The s tudy  a l s o  addressed t h e  e f f e c t  of v a r i a t i o n s  ' 
i n  t h e  weekly c l ima to log ica l  and hydro logica l  d a t a  (hence t h e  ex p o s t  
economic worth)  on t h e  u l t i m a t e  percentage of economic worth captured i n  t h e  
market. The 10-year per iod  beginning i n  1936 had t h e  h ighes t  c o e f f i c i e n t  of 
v a r i a t i o n  of t h e  discounted annual economic worth. The 10-year per iod 
s t a r t i n g  i n  1942 wi th  t h e  lowest economic worth a l s o  happened t o  be t h e  
sequence with t h e  next  t o  t h e  lowest c o e f f i c i e n t  of v a r i a t i o n .  (The s e r i e s  
beginning i n  1931 had a  moderate c o e f f i c i e n t  of v a r i a t i o n . )  
7.2.1 Ex Post Aggregate Economic Worth, and Imp l i ca t i ons  
F igure  7-3 summarizes t h e  r e s u l t s  of t he  ex  pos t  s imula t ion .  It can be 
seen t h a t  i n  a l l  t h r e e  10-year pe r iods ,  t he  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  markets f o r  
t h e  FFR and PSUR systems captured about t h e  same f r a c t i o n  of t h e  ex post 
opt imal  economic worth a s  t h e  no-foresight  markets (9422%). Since t h e  
a b i l i t y  t o  p r e d i c t  f u t u r e  events  w i l l  va ry  between p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  and no 
f o r e s i g h t ,  t he se  r e s u l t s  lead t o  t h e  conclusion t h a t  it i s  t h e  design of 
r i g h t s  r a t h e r  than  t h e  lack  of p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  of weather and streamflow 
d a t a ,  which i s  r e spons ib l e  f o r  t h e  sub-optimal performance of t he  system. 
This suggests  t h a t  it i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  base b ids  on t h e i r  expected economic 
worth, and t h a t  it might we l l  be a  waste of e f f o r t  f o r  a  bidder  t o  at tempt 
t o  p r e d i c t  t he  worth of water r i g h t .  It f u r t h e r  sugges ts  t h a t  i t  is  only by 
f i n e  tuning and, hence, complicating t h e  base r i g h t s  market t h a t  t he  l a s t  6% 
may be captured,  and t h a t  t h i s  t a s k  might b e s t  be l e f t  t o  the  spot  market. 
When a  discount  r a t e  of 20% was applied t o  t h e  10-year period with s t a r t i n g  
year 1931, a  s i m i l a r  ( s l i g h t l y  lower) percentage ( 9 2 . 5 9 % )  of aggregate 
economic worth f o r  t h e  FFR and PSUR systems r e s u l t e d ,  which seems t o  
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t he  above r e s u l t s  a r e  somewhat i n s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  discount  
r a t e .  
7.2.2 Ex Post D i s t r i b u t i o n  of F inancia l  Worth 
The d i s t r i b u t i o n  of ex pos t  annual f i n a n c i a l  worths f o r  t he  10-year 
period s t a r t i n g  i n  1936 under condi t ions  of no f o r e s i g h t  i s  p l o t t e d  i n  
Figure 7-4. The d i s t r i b u t i o n s  of t he  o the r  two 10-year periods a r e  s i m i l a r .  
The negat ive  f i n a n c i a l  worths f o r  t he  PSUR second p r i ce  auc t ion  may be 
a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  assumption t h a t  t he  b i d s  were formulated ex a n t e  and f o r  
t h e  10-year sequence chosen, these  exceeded t h e  economic worth f o r  most 
users .  The o t h e r  auc t ion  mechanisms show d i s t r i b u t i o n s  of f i n a n c i a l  worths 
somewhat s i m i l a r  t o  those shown i n  the  ex a n t e  cases;  i . e . ,  t h e  
lower-numbered users  r e a l i z e  a  higher share  of p r o f i t .  
7.3 COMPARISON OF EX POST AND EX ANTE ANALYSES 
The f r a c t i o n  of optimal aggregate economic worth captured by the  ex 
pos t  markets with pe r fec t  or  with no f o r e s i g h t  (9422% of t h e  optimal 
a l l o c a t i o n s )  i s  about t h e  same a s  t h a t  of t h e  ex a n t e  ana lys i s  (94.5%). 
Expressed a s  a  percentage of t he  d i f f e rence  between t h e  aggregate economic 
worth of t he  4%- no t r a d e  pol icy under condi t ions  of no f o r e s i g h t  and t h a t  
of the  optimal a l l o c a t i o n s ,  t h i s  f r a c t i o n  v a r i e s  from 59 t o  79%, compared t o  
65% i n  t h e  ex a n t e  r e s u l t s .  This suggests  t h a t  the  percentage of aggregate 
economic worth captured i n  the  a c t u a l  market is  more o r  l e s s  predicted from 
the  b ids  based on expected economic worth. 
7.3.1 Impl ica t ions  f o r  Spot Market 
Pe r iod ic  t r ad ing  of short-term water r i g h t s  i n  a  spontaneous and 
informal spot  market could be an important process i n  recaptur ing  economic 
e f f i c i e n c y  of t he  base market. The spot  market might be formalized i f  some 
g a i n  is seen by a l l  users .  I n  t h e  four  market p o l i c i e s  examined, t h e  
maximum amount of aggregate economic worth t h a t  could be recaptured i n  the  
spot  market was about 5.5% of the  ex a n t e  opt imal ,  o r  35% of t h e  d i f f e rence  
i n  economic worth between t h e  4%-each non-market pol icy  and t h e  ex a n t e  
optimal a l l o c a t i o n .  
Par t  of t h e  economic e f f i c i e n c y  l o s t  i n  the  PSUR and FFR schemes might 
be expected t o  be regained i n  the  spot  market. The po r t ion  of economic 
e f f i c i e n c y  t h a t  could not  be recovered i n  the  spot  market is  t h a t  which is 
l o s t  because of i )  c a p i t a l  investment dec i s ions  which a r e  ex  a n t e  optimal 
but ex pos t  suboptimal,  and i i )  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  cos t s .  Imperfect p red ic t ion  
of the  f u t u r e  cos t  and worth of water a f f e c t s  a l l  u se r s ,  bu t  is p a r t i c u l a r l y  
harmful t o  margina l ly  p r o f i t a b l e  users  who may not  make t h e  c o r r e c t  dec is ion  
regarding c a p i t a l  investment. The spot  market can only  p a r t i a l l y  recoup the  
l o s s  a s soc ia t ed  wi th  such e f f e c t s .  In  t h i s  s tudy,  t h e  l o s s  due t o  an 
inco r rec t  dec i s ion  t o  purchase equipment was found t o  be very small  ( l e s s  
than 1% of t h e  opt imal  economic worth) f o r  both the  FFR and PSWR systems, 
al though,  depending on the  pol icy  opt ion  chosen, t h e  l o s s  t o  an ind iv idua l  
user  could be s u b s t a n t i a l .  
In  a  more r e a l i s t i c  and heterogeneous market involving i n d u s t r i a l ,  
municipal and power water uses a s  w e l l  a s  i r r i g a t i o n ,  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  ga in  of 
the  spot  market system might be more o r  l e s s  favorable.  Regardless of how 
small  t he  p o t e n t i a l  ga in  i n  the  spot  market is, i t s  e l imina t ion  from t h e  
market system may pose some problems. I n  a c t u a l  p r a c t i c e ,  i f  b idders  know 
i n  advance t h a t  no spot  t rad ing  is allowed, they might, f o r  s e c u r i t y  
reasons ,  tend t o  b id  higher  ( t o  include t h e  op t ion  va lue )  [ see  f o r  example 
K r u t i l l a ,  19671 f o r  t h e  same r i g h t  than i f  short-term t r ad ing  were allowed. 
































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure  7-3. Annual Ex Post Aggregate Economic Worths f o r  t h e  
FFR a n d F S m a r k e t s  w i t h  Perfect Foresi  ght  and 
w i t h  No Foresight,  Expressed as t h e  Percentages 
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Unl ike  t h e  FFR's which a r e  homogeneous goods,  t h e  PSUR's a r e  
heterogeneous  goods,  which w i l l  r e n d e r  t h e  l a t t e r  sys tem more cumbersome, 
o p e r a t i o n a l l y .  From t h e  s i m u l a t i o n  r e s u l t s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  s t u d y ,  it 
a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e  more s imple  one-parameter FFR system c a p t u r e s  about  t h e  
same amount of a g g r e g a t e  economic worth  which may s u g g e s t  t h a t ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  
FFR i s  a b e t t e r  method i n  p r a c t i c e .  However, it  shou ld  be borne  i n  mind 
t h a t  t h e s e  s i m u l a t i o n  a n a l y s e s  a r e  based on a  d a t a  b a s e  i n  which t h e  
u t i l i z a t i o n  of wa te r  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  "uniform." D i f f e r e n t  market systems may 
b e  more d e s i r a b l e  i n  d i f f e r e n t  market r e g i o n s ,  s i n c e  s i t u a t i o n s  va ry  from 
p l a c e  t o  p l a c e .  Besides  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of r i g h t s ,  t h e  g e o g r a p h i c a l  and 
h y d r o l o g i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  r e g i o n ,  t h e  purpose ,  e x t e n t  and t h e  p a t t e r n  
of w a t e r  u s e  a r e  a l l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which have a  g r e a t  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  
o v e r a l l  performance of t h e  system i n  a  w a t e r  r i g h t  market r e g i o n .  
The p o l i c y  of marke tab le  wa te r  pe rmi t s  seems t o  hold  promise a s  an  
e f f e c t i v e  means of r e g u l a t i n g  t h e  u s e  of wa te r  i n  r e g i o n s  where it is 
o c c a s i o n a l l y  o r  f r e q u e n t l y  s c a r c e .  Th is  r e p o r t  has p r e s e n t e d  a n  overview of 
some of t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  which must go i n t o  t h e  d e s i g n  of a  working w a t e r  
r i g h t s  system and has d i s c u s s e d  some f i n d i n g s  of a  c a s e  s t u d y  based upon a  
s i m u l a t e d  market u s i n g  r e a l  d a t a  which shed some q u a n t i t a t i v e  l i g h t  on t h e  
economic e f f i c i e n c y  and d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  f e a t u r e s  of such a  system. 
The p r e s e n t  s i m u l a t i o n  s t u d y  a p p l i e s  o n l y  t o  i r r i g a t i o n  w a t e r  use .  
F u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h  is needed t o  de te rmine  t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  of t h e  market systems 
f o r  a  more r e a l i s t i c  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  d i v e r s i f i e d  wate r  u s e s .  F u r t h e r  
r e s e a r c h  is  a l s o  needed t o  de te rmine  ways t o  i n t e g r a t e  t h e  market  system 
i n t o  t h e  p lann ing  p r o c e s s  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  w a t e r  supply  enhancement 
t e c h n i q u e s ,  such as r e s e r v o i r s  and c o n j u n c t i v e  s u r f a c e  and groundwater use .  
It seems r e a s o n a b l e  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  market  w i l l  p rov ide  i n f o r m a t i o n  
which may be used d i r e c t l y  t o  examine t h e  c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of such 
t e c h n i q u e s .  
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APPENDIX A 
SOME FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
-
OF WATER RIGHTS MARKETS 
-- 
A-1 OBSTACLES TO ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
A s  i nd i ca t ed  i n  s eve ra l  p l aces  i n  t he  r e p o r t ,  t h e r e  a r e  a  number of 
o b s t a c l e s ,  i n  designing a  water  r i g h t s  market system, t o  achieving an 
opt imal  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of water .  We i d e n t i f y  t h e s e  o b s t a c l e s  and d i scus s  them 
i n d i v i d u a l l y  i n  t h e  fol lowing paragraphs.  
The f i r s t  o b s t a c l e  t o  e f f i c i e n c y ,  a s  mentioned above, i s  unce r t a in ty .  
~f  it were p o s s i b l e  t o  p r e d i c t  f u t u r e  va lues  of water  and f u t u r e  
streamflows, it would a l s o  be pos s ib l e  t o  determine a  s e t  of water  
a l l o c a t i o n s  t o  each use r  which would maximize t h e  n e t  aggrega te  b e n e f i t .  
This s e t  of a l l o c a t i o n s  and t h e  n e t  b e n e f i t  it  produces a r e  r e f e r r e d  t o  as  
t h e  ex post  optimum, and r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  g r e a t e s t  e f f i c i e n c y  a  market system 
may achieve under a  known f u t u r e .  I n  t h e  absence of p e r f e c t  p r e d i c t i o n s ,  
one may s t i l l  determine a  s e t  of expected opt imal  a l l o c a t i o n s .  This i s  
r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  t h e  ex a n t e  optimum, and r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  g r e a t e s t  expected n e t  
b e n e f i t  which may be  achieved by any market system, al though t h e  g r e a t e s t  
n e t  b e n e f i t  a c t u a l l y  r e a l i z e d  i n  a  g iven  case  may be g r e a t e r  o r  smal le r .  
The s t r u c t u r e  of t he  market system w i l l  n e c e s s a r i l y  in t roduce  c e r t a i n  
i n f l e x i b i l i t i e s  which prevent  t h e  a t ta inment  of e i t h e r  t h e  ex a n t e  o r  ex 
p o s t  optimum, o r  both.  To begin wi th ,  t h e  way i n  which base r i g h t s  a r e  
def ined w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  a l l o c a t i o n s  which may n o t  be opt imal  i n  a  g iven  
s i t u a t i o n .  Requiring a  g iven  use r  always t o  r ece ive  t h e  same f r a c t i o n  of t he  
streamflow w i l l ,  f o r  example, prevent  a  more opt imal  a l l o c a t i o n  which would 
have t h a t  user  r ece iv ing  a  high percentage a t  c e r t a i n  t imes and a  low 
percentage a t  o t h e r s .  S imi l a r ly ,  t h e  PSUR system a l s o  in t roduces  
i n f l e x i b i l i t i e s  which prevent  t h e  opt imal  a l l o c a t i o n  of water .  Of course ,  
t he  spot  market may c o r r e c t  f o r  t he se  i n f l e x i b i l i t i e s ,  bu t  a t  a  c e r t a i n  
p r i c e  i n  admin i s t r a t i ve  and t r a n s a c t i o n s  c o s t s .  
A second type of i n f l e x i b i l i t y  i s  introduced by the  way i n  which t h e  
spo t  market must be opera ted .  Whether o r  no t  t h e  spot  market does,  i n  f a c t ,  
c o r r e c t  f o r  t h e  i n e f f i c i e n c y  introduced by t h e  i n f l e x i b i l i t y  of t h e  base  
r i g h t s  market depends upon how s t r o n g l y  t he  cu r r en t  va lue  of water  i s  
r e l a t e d  t o  unknown f u t u r e  events .  I f  t h i s  dependence is ve ry  s t rong ,  
bidding on spo t  r i g h t s  w i l l  have t h e  same element of u n c e r t a i n t y  a s  bidding 
on base r i g h t s  had i n i t i a l l y .  For example, t h e  amount of i r r i g a t i o n  water 
app l i ed  t o  a  f i e l d  crop a t  p o l l i n a t i o n  time may determine t h e  degree of 
f r u i t  formation,  bu t  t he  u l t i m a t e  y i e l d  may depend j u s t  a s  s t r o n g l y  on t h e  
weather during t h e  maturing phase. Thus, t h e  va lue  of water  a t  p o l l i n a t i o n  
time would depend on t h e  unknown weather events  during t h e  maturing s t age .  
However, i f  t he  c u r r e n t  va lue  of t he  water  is independent of t h e  amount 
r ece ived  i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  then  the  spot  market is capable  of achieving t h e  ex 
p o s t  optimum. 
A t h i r d  c o n s t r a i n t  which may prevent  economic e f f i c i e n c y  i s  t he  
pos s ib l e  f a i l u r e  of t he  market procedure t o  a l l o c a t e  base  r i g h t s  so a s  t o  
maximize t h e i r  aggrega te  expected va lue .  There a r e  a  number of reasons why 
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t h i s  may occur ;  t h e  problem of sub-optimal packing of PSUR's was mentioned 
above, and w i l l  occur  w i t h  o r  wi thout  incent ive-compat ible  procedures .  
A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  t h e r e  may be  lumpiness i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  user ' s  demand curves  
( and , t hus ,  i n  t h e i r  b id  s chedu l e s )  f o r  r i g h t s .  Both of t h e s e  problems a r e  
more consequen t i a l  f o r  t h e  PSUR than  t h e  FFR system. The lumpiness and 
packing problems a r e  d i s cus sed  f u r t h e r  i n  sub-appendices fo l lowing  t h i s  one.  
To summarize, t h e  v a r i o u s  k inds  of u n c e r t a i n t y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  wate r  
r i g h t s  markets  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  i n e f f i c i e n t  u s e s  of wate r .  Some of t h e  
e f f i c i e n c y  i s  recovered i n  t h e  ba se  r i g h t s  system, through which a l l o c a t i o n s  
a r e  based on t h e  long-term expected v a l u e  of t h e  r i g h t .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  
t h e  a c t u a l  outcome d i f f e r s  from t h i s  e x p e c t a t i o n ,  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  by base  
r i g h t s  w i l l  be i n e f f i c i e n t .  The spo t  r i g h t s  market ,  on  t h e  o t h e r  hand, 
a l l o c a t e s  wate r  according t o  r e l a t i v e l y  shor t - t e rm p r e d i c t i o n s  and, 
a cco rd ing ly ,  has t h e  p o t e n t i a l  t o  r e c a p t u r e  somewhat more of t h e  economic 
worth .  L ike  t h e  ba se - r i gh t s  market ,  however, t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  a c t u a l  
outcome d i f f e r s  from t h i s  p r e d i c t i o n ,  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of wate r  by t h e  base- 
r i g h t s - s p o t - r i g h t s  combination w i l l  be i n e f f i c i e n t .  Never the less  t h e r e  i s  a 
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  high e f f i c i e n c i e s  may b e  r e a l i z e d  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  through 
proper  de s ign  of t h e  market .  
A-2 LUMPINESS I N  BIDS FOR BASE RIGHTS 
The worth of a base- r igh t  depends on t h e  t ype  of u se  t o  which t h e  
water  i s  t o  be  p u t ,  and on whether o r  no t  a l l  o r  p a r t  of t h e  water-using 
f a c i l i t y  has a l r e a d y  been b u < l t .  D i f f e r ences  among u s e r s  i n  t h e s e  r e s p e c t s  
imply t h a t  t h e  market procedure  may f a v o r  one type  of u s e r  over  ano the r .  A 
p o t e n t i a l  problem a r i s e s  due t o  l a r g e  d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s  i n  t h e  dependence of 
t h e  worth of base  r i g h t s  on t h e i r  s i z e ,  i n  bo th  t h e  PSUR and PPR systems. 
The same problem does no t  e x i s t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  j u n i o r i t y  i n  t h e  PSUR 
system. To i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  problem, we examine t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  
s i z e  of a r i g h t  (PSUR o r  PFR) and i t s  worth  f o r  f o u r  d i f f e r e n t  t ypes  of 
u s e r s .  To do s o ,  we c o n s t r u c t  a p l o t  of t h e  expected wor th  of a ba se  r i g h t  
a s  a f u n c t i o n  of i t s  s i z e ,  w i th  t h e  j u n i o r i t y  he ld  cons t an t  i f  t h e  r i g h t s  
a r e  de f i ned  a s  PSUR's. We s h a l l  r e f e r  t o  such p l o t s  a s  worth  cu rve s .  
F i g u r e  1-A i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  f i r s t  type  of worth curve ,  which would be 
t y p i c a l ,  f o r  example, of an i r r i g a t i o n  u s e r  whose water-using equipment 
was a l r e a d y  i n s t a l l e d .  The worth  of t h e  r i g h t ,  expressed  as expected p r e sen t  
o r  annua l  v a l u e ,  i s  a monoton ica l ly  i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  of i t s  s i z e ,  S i .  
Th i s  curve  e x h i b i t s  a un i formly  dec r ea s ing  marg ina l  worth  w i t h  s i z e ,  and 
w i l l  t h u s  imply a b i d  p r i c e  which dec r ea se s  un i formly  w i t h  t h e  s i z e  of t h e  
r i g h t ,  S i ,  a s  shown i n  t h e  r ight-hand pane l  of F igu re  1-A. 
The second type of worth curve i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by F i g u r e  1-B. and would 
be t y p i c a l  of an i r r i g a t i o n  u s e r  whose water-using equipment had n o t  y e t  
been purchased.  The e f f e c t  of t h e  c a p i t a l  investment(and o t h e r  f i x e d  c o s t s )  
i s  a s imple  downward displacement  of t h e  worth  curve i n  comparison t o  t h e  
f i r s t  type.  The e f f e c t  of t h i s  d isplacement  i s  t h a t  t h e  b idde r  w i l l  d e s i r e  
n o t  t o  own a r i g h t  whose s i z e  l i e s  between ze ro  and qo,  r e g a r d l e s s  of what 
t h e  p r i c e  is. H i s  h i g h e s t  b i d  p r i c e ,  Po, which i s  t h e  p r i c e  a t  which he i s  
i n d i f f e r e n t  between holding no r i g h t  and a r i g h t  of s i z e  qo,  is  equa l  t o  t h e  
maximum average  worth f o r  a l l  v a l u e s  of s i z e ,  and i s  t h e  s l ope  of a l i n e  
from t h e  o r i g i n  which is  tangen t  t o  t h e  worth curve.  Thus, t h e  demand curve ,  
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shown i n  the  r i g h t  panel of Figure 1-B, has an open o r  f l a t  po r t ion  
i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  a t  Po he i s  i n d i f f e r e n t  between holding no r i g h t  holding a 
r i g h t  of s i z e  So, and t h a t  he would p r e f e r  e i t h e r  t o  holding a number 
somewhere i n  between. 
The t h i r d  type of worth curve is  i l l u s t r a t e d  by Figure  1-C. This would 
be t y p i c a l  of an e x i s t i n g  f a c i l i t y  which was c u r r e n t l y  using l a rge  
q u a n t i t i e s  of water ,  and which would have t o  make a l a r g e  c a p i t a l  
investment i n  o rde r  t o  use l e s s .  An example might be a municipal water 
company, which may i n s t a l l  advanced sewage t reatment  and r ecyc l ing  i f  t he  
p r i c e  of water becomes p r o h i b i t i v e ,  but  which w i l l  s t i l l  need a small  amount 
of makeup water t o  cover evaporat ive lo s ses  ( a s  the  p r i c e  r i s e s  f u r t h e r  it 
w i l l  be w i l l i n g  t o  go t o  i nc reas ing ly  expensive techniques t o  reduce such 
l o s s e s ) .  For t h i s  type of u se r ,  t h e r e  is  a l s o  a concavi ty i n  t h e  worth 
curve,  and a corresponding open reg ion  ( s t e p )  i n  t he  demand schedule,  bu t  
they occur a t  near t he  maximum r a t h e r  than the  minimum s i z e .  
The f i n a l  type of worth curve i s  shown i n  F igure  1-D. This  curve would 
be t y p i c a l  of t he  same type of municipal water p l a n t ,  bu t  f o r  a newly- 
planned c i t y  which had not  y e t  been b u i l t .  As the  demand curve shows, two 
concav i t i e s  occur i n  t h i s  case,  and i t  i s  we l l  wi th in  the  realm of 
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t hese  concav i t i e s  could over lap ,  i n  which case the  demand 
curve would c o n s i s t  of two p o i n t s  which represented  the  all-or-nothing 
choices  on the  p a r t  of t he  use r .  
The ex i s t ence  of t hese  concav i t i e s  has two important impl ica t ions  f o r  
t h e  design of water r i g h t s  markets.  F i r s t ,  f o r  t he  PSUR market,  i f  t he  
a u t h o r i t y  p lans  t o  s e t  t he  s i z e  of r i g h t s  which a r e  t o  be t raded ,  it should 
not  s e t  them i n  such a manner a s  t o  p lace  a user  i n  one of these  concave 
reg ions .  To do so would cause s u b s t a n t i a l  equ i ty  problems, and could r e s u l t  
i n  s u b s t a n t i a l  mi sa l loca t ions  of base r i g h t s .  I n  a market which c o n s i s t s  of 
a very  heterogeneous mixture of t he  four  types of worth curves,  i t  may be 
very  d i f f i c u l t  t o  f i n d  a uniform s i z e  which w i l l  avoid these  concav i t i e s ,  
and so the  a u t h o r i t y  may have t o  allow the  b idder  t o  s e t  t he  s i z e ,  r e s u l t i n g  
i n  a more complex market. However, i f  t he  market is  more homogeneous, a s  it 
might be i f  s epa ra t e  water-using a c t i v i t i e s  had sepa ra t e  markets,  o r  i f  only 
c e r t a i n  a c t i v i t i e s  were regula ted  by markets a t  a l l ,  then  it might be 
poss ib l e  t o  i d e n t i f y  a s i z e  of r i g h t  which w i l l  a l low a l l  users  t o  avoid 
concav i t i e s .  
The second impl ica t ion  of worth curve concav i t i e s  i s  t h a t  i t  may be 
impossible  t o  c l e a r  t he  market under t he  FFR system. It may be t h a t ,  when 
the  ind iv idua l  demand schedules  a r e  aggregated t o  o b t a i n  an o v e r a l l  demand 
schedule,  the  1 Q O %  demand po in t  l i e s  wi th in  a concavity.  I n  such cases ,  t h e  
a u t h o r i t y  w i l l  have t o  s e t  some s o r t  of a r b i t r a r y  market-clearing r u l e ,  
e.g., i t  could e i t h e r  i s s u e  the  lower number of permits  o r  take some of t h e  
r e se rve  flow f o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  on the  market. 
A-3 THE PACKING PROBLEM FOR PSUR'S 
None of t he  auc t ion  procedures discussed above w i l l  n e c e s s a r i l y  
opt imize the  a l l o c a t i o n  of PSUR's, i n  the  sense of maximizing t h e  aggregate  
b id  va lue  of t he  r i g h t s  awarded. There a r e  two b a s i c  reasons  why such 
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m i s a l l o c a t i o n s  might occur .  One is  t h a t  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  market w i l l  
m i s a l l o c a t e ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of t h e  a c t i o n s  of t h e  b i d d e r s ,  and t h e  o t h e r  i s  t h a t  
t h e  market w i l l  encourage s t r a t e g i c  b i d d i n g ,  even when such normally- 
regarded  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  t r u t h f u l  b idd ing  a s  second-pr ice  a u c t i o n s  a r e  used.  
Two s imple  examples w i l l  s e r v e  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e s e  problems. Consider  an  
a u c t i o n  of l e n t i c  BSUR's w i t h  two b i d d e r s ,  two b l o c k s  of r i g h t s  each of 
e q u a l  s i z e  a t  two l e v e l s  of j u n i o r i t y .  There  a r e  f o u r  p o s s i b l e  a l l o c a t i o n s  
of r i g h t s  t o  each b i d d e r ,  and f o u r  f e a s i b l e  combinat ions  of a l l o c a t i o n s  t o  
t h e  two b i d d e r s  t aken  a s  a p a i r  ( s e e  Table  A-1). Each f e a s i b l e  a l l o c a t i o n  i s  
r e p r e s e n t e d  by one e n t r y  i n  t h e  worth t a b l e .  For  each of t h e  f o u r  p o s s i b l e  
a l l o c a t i o n s  f o r  a  g i v e n  b i d d e r ,  t h e  o n l y  f e a s i b l e  a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  
b i d d e r  i s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  o p p o s i t e  c o r n e r  of t h e  worth  t a b l e .  The market 
w i l l  be assumed t o  a l l o c a t e  f i r s t  t h e  l o w - j u n i o r i t y  r i g h t ,  t o  t h e  h i g h e s t  
b i d d e r .  While t h e  worth of t h a t  r i g h t  depends,  f o r  each b i d d e r ,  on whether 
o r  n o t  he r e c e i v e s  t h e  h i g h - j u n i o r i t y  r i g h t  a s  w e l l ,  i t  i s  assumed h e r e  t h a t  
t h e  u s e r  w i l l  b i d  t h e  v a l u e  he p l a c e s  on t h a t  r i g h t  a l o n e .  Under such a n  
assumption,  Bidder A  w i l l  r e c e i v e  t h e  low- jun ior i ty  r i g h t ,  a s  shown by t h e  
b i d  s c h e d u l e  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  round of b i d d i n g ,  Next, t h e  h i g h - j u n i o r i t y  r i g h t  
i s  s o l d ;  h e r e ,  it is  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  assume t h a t  a n  "honest" Bidder A  w i l l  b i d  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between h i s  worth  f o r  t h e  low- jun ior i ty  r i g h t  and h i s  worth  
f o r  bo th ,  and t h a t  a n  "honest" Bidder B  w i l l  b i d  h i s  worth  f o r  t h e  high- 
j u n i o r i t y  r i g h t  a lone .  Thus t h e  market a l l o c a t e s  t h e  second r i g h t  t o  Bidder 
A  a s  w e l l .  It may be  s e e n  t h a t ,  whereas t h e  op t imal  a l l o c a t i o n  i s  t o  g i v e  
b o t h  r i g h t s  t o  Bidder B  f o r  a  t o t a l  worth  of 1 9 ,  t h e  marke t ,  even when b o t h  
b i d d e r s  a r e  a s  hones t  a s  could  be expec ted ,  a l l o c a t e s  b o t h  r i g h t s  t o  Bidder 
A, f o r  a  t o t a l  worth of 17 .  
To i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  second m i s a l l o c a t i o n  e f f e c t ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  o n l y  t o  
change two of t h e  wor ths ,  a s  shown i n  Tab le  A-2. With t h i s  s e t  of worths ,  
t h e  market w i l l  a l l o c a t e  o p t i m a l l y ,  a s  long a s  t h e  b i d s  a r e  hones t ,  a s  shown 
i n  t h e  t a b l e .  However, a s  t h e  t a b l e  a l s o  shows, Bidder A, i f  he knows Bidder 
B's worth t a b l e ,  may b i d  s t r a t e g i c a l l y  i n  o r d e r  t o  t a k e  t h e  r i g h t s  f o r  
h imse l f .  Even i f  he does  n o t  know t h e  worths  t o  t h e  o t h e r  b i d d e r s  ( i n  
g e n e r a l ,  t h e r e  w i l l  be more t h a n  o n e ) ,  i f  he knows t h a t  t h e  g e n e r a l  
s t r u c t u r e  of t h e i r  worth  c u r v e s  a r e  s i m i l a r ,  i . e . ,  i f  he knows t h a t  t h e  
h i g h - j u n i o r i t y  r i g h t  i s  worth  l e s s  wi thou t  t h e  l o w - j u n i o r i t y  r i g h t  t h a n  w i t h  
i t ,  t h e n  he may a t t e m p t  t o  "bumptt h i s  c o m p e t i t o r s  by o u t b i d d i n g  them ( a t  a  
l o s s  t o  h i m s e l f )  f o r  low- jun ior i ty  r i g h t s  and a t t e m p t i n g  t o  make up t h e  l o s s  
by underb idd ing  f o r  t h e  h i g h - j u n i o r i t y  r i g h t s ,  s e c u r e  i n  t h e  knowledge t h a t  
t h e i r  b i d s  f o r  t h e s e  r i g h t s  w i l l  be  lower t h a n  h i s  f a l s e l y  low b i d .  
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TABLE A-1- UNINTENTIONAL MISALLOCATION OF BASE RIGHTS 
Worth Tables: 
Bidder A Holds : Bidder B Holds: 
None IHigh, no t  Low None IHigh, no tLow 
I I 
0 I 5 0 I 3 
I I 
I I 
11 1 17 10 1 19  
I I 
Low, not  high I Both Low, not  High I Both 
Bid Schedules: 
F i r s t  Round: Low j u n i o r i t y  
A: 11 B: 10 
Second Round: High J u n i o r i t y  
A: 17-11~6 B: 3 
A r ece ives  both r i g h t s  a t  a va lue  of 17; opt imal  a l l o c a t i o n  
i s  t o  award both t o  B f o r  a va lue  of 19. 
TABLE A-2- INTENTIONAL MISALLOCATION OF BASE RIGHTS 
Worth Tables: 
c Bidder A Holds: Bidder B Holds : 
None I ~ i g h ,  not  low None IHigh, no t  low 
1 1 
0 I 5 0 I 3 
10 I 17 11 I 19  
I I 
Low, no t  ~ i g h l  Both Low, not  High 1 Both 
Market w i l l  a l l o c a t e  opt imal ly  wi th  honest bidding:  
F i r s t  Round: Low j u n i o r i t y  
A: 10 B : l l  
Second Round: High j u n i o r i t y  
A: 5 B: 8 
However, i f  A b i d s  s t r a t e g i c a l l y :  
F i r s t  Round:Low j u n i o r i t y  
A: 12 B: 11 
A i s  awarded t h e  r i g h t  a t  a cos t  of 11, 1 more than i t s  worth t o  him 
Second Round : High J u n i o r i t y  
A: 7-2=5 B:3 
A may b i d  enough l e s s  than t h e  r i g h t  i s  worth t o  him t o  make 
up h i s  overbid on the  low j u n i o r i t y  r i g h t ,  and s t i l l  be awarded 
the  r i g h t .  
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A s  the  number of b idders  o r  t h e  complexity of t h e  market i nc reases ,  t h e  
l i ke l i hood  of these  m i s a l l o c a t i o n s  occur r ing  does no t  diminish a s  i t  does i n  
t h e  case  of markets f o r  homogeneous goods. The bidding s t r a t e g y  may become 
more d i f f i c u l t  t o  determine,  bu t  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  any l e s s  p r o f i t a b l e .  
Likewise,  t h e  un in t en t iona l  mi sa l l oca t ions  a r e  a l s o  l i k e l y  t o  occur w i th  a  
l a r g e  number of b idders  and l e v e l s  of j u n i o r i t y .  It may happen t h a t  f o r  
s e v e r a l  s p e c i f i c  v a r i a t i o n s  of t h e  market procedure,  where t h e  worth curves 
have p a r t i c u l a r  p r o p e r t i e s ,  no m i s a l l o c a t i o n s ,  o r  one but  no t  t h e  o t h e r  type 
of mi sa l l oca t ion ,  w i l l  occur ,  b u t ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  suboptimal mi sa l l oca t ions  
w i l l  be a  problem wi th  t h e  PSUR market.  
I n  t h e  fol lowing paragraphs,  we expand upon some of t h e  m a t e r i a l  
p resen ted  i n  Sec t ion  3.2,  and i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  of determining an 
opt imal  a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  l e n t i c  PSUR's. Assume t h e r e  i s  no a u c t i o n  per s e  and 
t h e  a u t h o r i t y  simply has acces s  t o  each user 's  worth curve. This i s  a  
r a t h e r  d i f f i c u l t  combinator ia l  problem, bu t  may be so lved ,  i n  theory ,  i f  
no t  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  by t h e  fol lowing technique.  The PSUR's a r e  d i s c r e t i z e d  
i n t o  smal l  r i g h t s  of equal  s i z e  and cont iguous j u n i o r i t y ;  t hus ,  i f  t he  s i z e  
increment i s  one g a l l o n  per minute,  we may th ink  of a l l  r i g h t s  a s  being 
broken up i n t o  t h e  f i r s t  gpm, t h e  second gpm, t h e  t h i r d ,  e t c ,  where t h e  i - th  
gpm i s  a  r i g h t  wi th  a  j u n i o r i t y  of i-1 and a  s i z e  of one gpm. The g o a l ,  
whether undertaken through an auc t ion  procedure o r  by f i a t ,  i s  t o  a l l o c a t e  
t he se  r i g h t s  so a s  t o  maximize t h e  aggrega te  expected va lue  of t hose  
awarded. Immediately we  perce ive  a  problem, i n  t h a t  t h e  va lue  a  u se r  p l aces  
on any g iven  r i g h t  depends on what o t h e r  r i g h t s  he holds .  We may express  t h e  
a l l o c a t i o n  problem a s  t h e  cons t ra ined  op t imiza t ion  problem: 
Maximize 
Subjec t  t o :  
1 1 , A l l  i 
j 
Where : 
X . .  = I ,  i f  u se r  j  is  awarded t h e  i t h  r i g h t  
1J 
X =0, o therwise  
ij 
To so lve  t h i s  problem by t o t a l  enumeration r e q u i r e s  t h e  eva lua t ion  and 
m 
comparison of n combinations,  which is  i n t r a c t a b l e  even f o r  smal l  test 
problems. It i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h i s  problem may be solved wi th  somewhat l e s s  
e f f o r t  by dynamic programming, but  it i s  s t i l l  pos s ib l e  t h a t  it  w i l l  exceed 
t h e  capac i ty  of most e x i s t i n g  machines, s i n c e  i t  would r e q u i r e  t h e  
eva lua t ion  of a t  l e a s t  2m a l t e r n a t i v e s  a t  each s t a g e  of a  dynamic 
programming procedure.  
Under any of t h e  auc t ion  procedures  mentioned above, a d d i t i o n a l  
c o n s t r a i n t s  a r e  placed on t h i s  problem which may s imp l i fy  i t s  s o l u t i o n .  
However, even wi th  t he se  a d d i t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  t h e  a u c t i o n  procedure 
i t s e l f  may no t  a l l o c a t e  t h e  r i g h t s  op t imal ly .  A s  an example, one may 
cons ider  t h e  simple case  where t h e  the  a u t h o r i t y  s e t s  t h e  s i z e s  of a l l  
r i g h t s  equa l ,  each u s e r  is  permit ted one and on ly  one r i g h t ,  and t h e  r i g h t s  
a r e  d i s t r i b u t e d  by awarding each r i g h t  t o  t h e  h ighes t  b idder  among those  
u s e r s  who have no t  a l r eady  won lower- jun ior i ty  r i g h t s .  The opt imal  
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a l l o c a t i o n  of such a  s e t  of r i g h t s ,  given t h a t  the  b ids  r e f l e c t  t h e i r  t rue  
value,  i s  the  so lu t ion  of the  problem: 
Maximize 
Subject to :  
Where : 
C X =1 , A l l  i 
j i j  
C X I  , A l l  j 
i 
'ij =1 i f  user  j  i s  awarded the i t h  r i g h t  
X =O otheirwise 
i j 
and W i s  the  worth of the  i t h  r i g h t  t o  user j. 
This i s  a  c l a s s i c  assignment problem, which may be solved by any one of 
a  number of expedient techniques, but the  auction mechanism w i l l  not 
necessa r i ly  reproduce t h i s  assignment. Nonetheless, it may be shown t h a t  
the  following condit ions w i l l  permit the  market t o  make an optimal 
assignment: 
'ij + '~+l,~+l - ' Wi+l,j + wi,j+l ' A l l  i, j  , 
where W i s  the  worth of the  j t h  jun io r i ty  r i g h t  t o  user  i. 
i j 
To summarize, the  auction protocol  may be viewed a s  a  h e u r i s t i c  
which w i l l  a l l o c a t e  the  r i g h t s  in  an avvroximately optimal fashion. The 
"best" protocol  w i l l  vary according t o  the  type and homogeneity of type of 
water use,  a s  wel l  a s  the  na ture  of the  watercourse. Under favorable 
circumstances, the  f r a c t i o n  of the  optimal worth recovered by the  marke-t 
mechanism can be q u i t e  high. 
These misa l locat ions  may be r e c t i f i e d  by the post-auction informal 
t rading of base r i g h t s  which would be expected as  long a s  no r e s t r i c t i o n s  
a r e  placed on t h i s  mode of t r a n s f e r ,  o r  by a  formal spot market. While t h i s  
does not necessa r i ly  ind ica te  t h a t  no e f f o r t  should be made t o  design 
e f f i c i en t ly -a l loca t ing  base r i g h t s  markets, it  does suggest t h a t  a  market 
which avvroximatelv optimizes the  a l loca t ions  may be s u f f i c i e n t  even i f  it 
does not recapture  the  l a s t  few percent of the  economic worth. It should 
a l s o  be kept i n  mind t h a t  even an optimal a l l o c a t i o n  of base r i g h t s ,  i e . ,  
one which maximizes the aggregate bid worth, w i l l  not  necessa r i ly  r e s u l t  i n  
e i t h e r  the  ex an te  optimal a l l o c a t i o n  (based on the  expected worth),  due t o  
the  r e s t r i c t i o n s  imposed by the  d e f i n i t i o n s  of the  r i g h t s ,  o r  the  ex vost  
optimal a l l o c a t i o n  (based on the  ac tua l  outcome), due t o  the  uncer ta in ty  
e f f e c t  . 
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puo aaoxodas q~oa (s~qS?x 30 sy~olq) spooS ,m qa?a aayxom 8 xaprsnoa 
*maasds xnsd aqa 
U? pasn ampa~oxd aqa 30 uo?aoTnmxoj le~?aomaqaom o ST %u?ao~~o~ aqj 
*sxapp?q 118 xoj amos 
aqa ST q3jqa a7373ap xo snldxns aqa 30 no?a~oxj o ssal ([086~] uoslanmes 
lo [LS6T] BJJ?BX PUB 33nT 338 'lalS8~y dq paU?Jap S8) ,,al8qS 1?8Jll S?q 
ssal saa?aDax xapp?q TnjssaDDns 13 aqS~x xaaon aqa 30 anloa p?q aqa 03 lonba 
s? sxapplq xaqao oa auadod aqa 'aqS?x da?xo~nn[ u?oaxaD o xod -auaxajj?p 
ax8 sauadod-aprs aqa anq 6no?aDn8 a~rxd puoaas aqa xoj so amos aqa ST 
saqS?x 30 no?anq?xas?p aqz aqa 30 asno~aq salnsax axnaoaj srqz *p?q asaqS?q 
aqa qa~a xapplq aqa 03 pauSrsso X~~xessa~au aon s? aq%?x aqa gauloxasno~ 
s?qa 30 alnsax o sv -saqS?x 30 qaxon aqa u? da?l?qoxodasur 30 ma~qoxd 
aqa ssaxppo oa admaaao uo u? pappo s? an?ox~suo~ s?qz *aq%rx auo dlno 
pue auo aaTa9ax asnm xapprq q~oa aoqa nolxaa?xD lono?a?ppo uo s? axaqa aoqa 
U? xaasanx dq paasaSSns axnpa~oxd aqa moxj sxajjlp axaq padoldma axnpa9oxd 
s,xaasoux pa?j?pom aqz -sanloa ,saqS?x aqa axoqs saq$x 30 sxanu?a-uou 
UaAa 'ampa~oxd UO?S?A?p 1183 8 dq Saq%?1 %U?~BDOTTB UI *[I861 'uo~? 
aas] axaqnasla passnDs?p uaaq aaoq sarmxad aSxoq~s?p alqoxajsuox~ 03 pa~~ddo 
so spooS alq?sra?pu? lo3 uo?s?A?p x?oj 30 ameS aqa 30 sa?~ladold 
where 
EWwr - Fwr - 'r i f  i = w  ( i . e . ,  f o r  t h e  bidder  
winning the  r i g h t )  
ir 
-( Fir + Sr otherwise ( i . e . ,  f o r  any 
o t h e r  b idder  ) 
The n e t  f i n a n c i a l  worth of goods and payments f o r  bidder  i is 
Let u se r  1 be bidder  1, user  2  be bidder  2,  and so on, and l e t  i tem 1 
be the  block of r i g h t  wi th  j u n i o r i t y  0 ,  item 2, j u n i o r i t y  0.095 cms, e t c .  
The sequen t i a l  auc t ion  used was t h a t  t h e  rth r i g h t  was always awarded t o  
u se r  r ;  thus ,  t he  n e t  f i n a n c i a l  worth of r i g h t s  and payments t o  user  i is 
which leads  t o  Equation 12  i n  Sect ion 6. 
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APPENDIX C 
FLOW CHARTS SHOWING THE COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURE FOR THE 
WATER DEMAND SCHEDULES FOR THE FFR AND PSUR SYSTEMS 

FFR a System 
I Pick One User I 
P~ck One " ~ r a c t i o n  of  low", FF  
(In Ascending Order From 0 to I )  
1 = 
Compute g = Q . F F / R  
Worth, EW = W .  f . g  
Pick Next Week 
Compute 
Sum of All E W ' S  
E(FF)'(With Same F F  
Compute I P =  E I F F  I Compute E - Last E 
Set Al l  Previous P'S To Max.P 1 
Pick Next F F  I 
IFLAG s2-l 
, ,  + ~ j  
Set All Previous P's To Max. P 
Store 8 Print P's 
Pick Next User 
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PROGRAM EXOPT (PF1, PF2 ,PF3, PF4 ,PF 5, STRST0,RESULl m T P U T ,  
1 TAPEl=PFl,TAPE2=PF2,TAPE3=PF3,TAPE4=PF4, 




c PROGRAM TO COMPUTE AN (APPROXIMATE) EXANTE OR EXPOST (WITH 
C PERFECT FORESIGHT) OPTIMAL ECONOMIC WORTH (REVENUE GENERATED FROM 













PRINT*, "IFLAG2 (0 FOR 1ST RUN, 1 OTHERWISE) =", 
READ *, IFLAG2 
PRINT*, "NUMBER OF FILES", 
READ *, NFILE 
PRINT*, "FILE NAME(S)= (FoRMAT(~OA~))", 
READ105, (FNAME(I) ,I=1 ,NFILE) 
PRINT*, "NUMBER OF YEARS", 
READ *, NYR 
PRINT*, "ENTER STARTING YEAR ", 
READ *, ISTART 
PRINT*, "ENTER INTEREST RATE AS A FRACTION", 
READ *, INT 
C 
NPER= NYR * NWK 
IF(IFLAG~.EQ.~) GO TO 520 
REWIND 6 
READ (6,102) (STREAL(I) ,1=1 ,NPER) 
510 READ (7,103) 
IF(EOF(~) .EQ.O) GO TO 510 
520 ISM1 = (ISTART-l)*NWK 
CRF=l . /FLOAT (NYR) 
IF (1NT.EQ.O.) GO TO 525 
TEMP = ( 1. +INT )**NYR 
CRF = INT * TEMP / (TEMP - 1.) 
525 WRITE(7,*) IFLAG2,NFILE,NYR,ISTART,INT,CRF 
DO 530 I=1, NYR 
SPPWF(I) = (~.+INT)**(-I) 
 WRITE(^ ,*) SPPWF(1) 
530 CONTINUE 
C 
DO 600 IFILE=l,NFILE 
TOTAL90 .0 
REWIND IFILE 
IF(ISTART.EQ.~) GO TO 537 
DO 53 5 I=1, ISM1 
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535 READ(IFILE,~OO) VALUE,STREAM,WATREQ 
C 
537 DO 550 IYR=l,NYR 
SUMV=O . 
DO 540 IWK=l, NWK 
NW = (IYR - 1) * NWK + IWK 
READ(IFILE,~OO) VALUE,STREAM,WATREQ 
IF(IFLAGZ.EQ.~) STREAL(NW)=STREAM 
IF(STREAL(NW).LE.~.~> GO TO 540 








TOTAL=TOTAL*CRF - CCOST 
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C PROGRAM TO COMPUTE THE WORTH AND DEMAND CURVES OF WATER 




REAL P(540), ~(5401, R(540) ,SPPWF(54), INT 
COMMON /CM/R,V,NPERS 
DATA IIN,IOUT/~,~/ ,CCOST/68.54/ ,NWK/lO/ 
C 
10 FORMAT(I5,F5 .2,15) 
20 FoRMAT(~F~O .2,~10.4) 
30 FORMAT(-~PF~O.~,OPF~O.~,+~PF~O.~) 
C 
PRINT*, "PRESEASON SOIL MOISTURE CONTENT, W =", 
READ *, W 
C PRINT*, "NNUMBER OF YEARS", 
READ *, NYR 
PRINT*, "ENTER STARTING YEAR", 
READ *, ISTART 
PRINT*, "ENTER INTEREST RATE AS A FRACTION", 
READ *, INT 
C 
C 
NPTRS = 0 
SUMW=O . 
ISM~=(ISTART-~)*NWK 
CRF = 1 . /FLOAT (NYR) 
IF(INT.EQ.O.) GO TO 430 
TEMP=(~.+INT)**NYR 
CRF=INT*TEMP/ (TEMP-1 . ) 
430 DO 440 I=l,NYR 
440 SPPWF(I)=(~ .+INT)**(-I) 
REWIND 5 
IF ( ISTART. EQ. 1 GO TO 445 
DO 443 I=l,ISMl 
443 READ(IIN,~O) TW,QWEEK,TI 
C 
C DELETE PERIOD WITH ZERO IRRIGATION WATER (HENCE ZERO %FLOW) 
C SUM UP MARGINAL WORTH FOR PERIOD WITH IRRIGATION WATER > FLOW 
C SUM UP ALL THE +VE MARGINAL WORTH 
C I 
445 DO 500 IYR=l,NYR 
DO 500 IWK=l,NWK 
READ(IIN,20) TW,QWEEK,TI 
IF( TI .EQ. 0. ) GO TO 500 
TR=TI/QWEEK 
TV=TW/TR *SPPWF ( IYR ) 
IF ( TR .GT. 1. ) GO TO 450 
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500 CONTINUE 
C 
C CALL SORTN TO SORT %FLOW AND CORRESPONDING MARGINAL WORTH 




C SUM UP MARGINAL WORTH OF SAME %FLOW 
C 
NP=O 
NPER = NPERS - 1 
C 
DO 600 IP-1 ,NPER 
IF(R(IP+~).NE.R(IP)) GO TO 550 
V(IP+l )=V( IP+l >+V(IP) 















V( 1 )=SUMW*R (1 )*CRF - CCOST 
P(1) = V(l)/R(l) 
C 
DO 700 IP=2,NP 
SUMW-SUMW-PW 
PW = V(IP) 
V(IP) = (R(IP)*SUMW+SW)*CRF - CCOST 
sw = sw + R(IP)*PW 
IF(ICODE.EQ.O) GO TO 650 
P (1P-1 ) =SUMW*CRF 
GO TO 700 
650 POP) = V(IP)/R(IP) 
IF(P(IP).GE.P(IP-1)) GO TO 700 
ICODE = 1 
KK = IP - 1 
DO 680 I=l,KK 
680 P(1) = P(KK) 
700 CONTINUE 
C 




DO 800 I=1, NP 
WRITE(IOUT,~~) P(1) ,V(I) ,R(I) 
800 CONTINUE 







REAL ~ ~ ( 5 4 0 ) , ~ ~ ( 5 4 0 )  
COMMON /cM/SA,SC,NE 
C 
DO 600 I=2,NE 
TA=SA( I ) 
TC=SC ( I ) 
K K = I - 1  
DO 500 K=1 ,KK 
J=I-K 
IF (TA.GE.SA(J)) GO TO 600 
SA(J+l) = SA(J9 
SC(J+l) = SC(J) 
SA(J) = TA 
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C PROGRAM TO COMPUTE THE WORTH OF WATER AT EACH JUNIORITY LEVEL 




REAL TVALUE ( 10,25 ) , SPPW ( 54 ) ,MAXTOT, JUNIOR, JINCR , INT 





PRINT*, "THE NUMBER OF YEARS OF RECORD IS", 
READ * , NYR 
PRINT*, "STARTING YEAR", 
READ *, ISTART 
PRINT*, "THE DIFFERENCE IN CFS BETWEEN JUNIORITIES IS", 
READ *, JINCR 
PRINT*, "THE MAXIMUM TOTAL PRECIPITATION PLUS IRRIGATION IS", 
READ *, MAXTOT 
PRINT*, "THE ANNUAL CAPITAL COST OF EQUIPMENT IS", 
READ *, CCOST 
PRINT*, "ENTER INTEREST RATE AS A FRACTION", 
READ *, INT 
C 
CONST = MAX~0~*280.*43560./(12.*7.*24.*3600) 
ISMI = ( ISTART-i )*NWK 
CRF = ~./FLOAT(NYR) 
IF (INT.EQ.O.) GO TO 500 
TEMP = (~.+INT)**NYR 
CRT = INT * TEMP / (TEMP - 1.) 
500 DO 520 I=l,NYR 
520 SpPWF(1) = (~.+INT)**(-I) 
IF(ISTART.EQ.~) GO TO 540 
DO 530 I=l,ISMl 
530 READ(~,~O) VALUE,FLOW,TOTREQ 
C 
540 DO 550 I=l,NJSIZE 
DO 550 J=1, NJUNI 
550 TVALUE(I,J)=O. 
C 
DO 700 IYR=l,NYR 
DO 700 IWK=l,NWK 
READ ( 5,2 0 ) VALUE, FLOW, TOTREQ 
IF(VALUE.LE.O.~) GO TO 700 
DO 675 ISIZE=l,NJSIZE 
SIZE=(ISIZE/FLOAT(NJSIZE))*CONST 
IF(TOTREQ.LE.~IZE)~IZE=TOTREQ 
DO 650 J=1, NJUNI 
JUNIOR=( J-1 )*JINCR 
REMING=FLOW-JUNIOR 
IF(REMING.LT.O.O) GO TO 650 
IF(REMING .GT. SIZE) TVALUE (ISIZE, J)=TVALUE (ISIZE, J) 
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* + ( VALUE*SIZE/TOTREQ)*SPPWF ( IYR) 
IF(REMING .LT. SIZE) TVALUE (ISIZE, J)=TVALUE (ISIZE, J) 





DO 800 J=l,NJUNI 
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DO 550 J=l,N 
PAYOFF (J )=O . 
DO 500 I=l,M 
500 READ(2,lO) SATV(1,J) 
550 WR1~~(3,20) (sATv(I,J),I=~,M) 
C 
DO 600 I=1 ,M 
NUSER=O 
SUMV=O . 
DO 570 J=l,N 
V=SATV(I,J) 
ZF(V.LE.0.) GO TO 570 
C NUMBER OF USERS WHO SUBMIT POSITIVE BIDS FOR ITEM I 
NUSER=NUSER+l 




IF(NUSER.EQ.~) GO TO 600 
C FOS: FRACTION OF SURPLUS OR DEFICIT FOR ITEM I 
FO~-(~ATV(I,I)-~UMV/NUSER)/NUSER 
DO 590 K=l ,N 
V=SATV( I ,K) 
IF(v.LE.O.) GO TO 590 
C VINUSER: FAIR SHARE OF ITEM M FOR USER K 
PAYOFF(K) = PAYOFF(K) + V/NUSER + FOS 
590 CONTINUE 
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